Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 36

Issue 4

2015

The Global Architecture of Financial Regulatory Taxes
Carlo Garbarino
Università Bocconi

Giulio Allevato
SDA Bocconi School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and
Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Carlo Garbarino & Giulio Allevato, The Global Architecture of Financial Regulatory Taxes, 36 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 603 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol36/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE OF FINANCIAL
REGULATORY TAXES
Carlo Garbarino* and Giulio Allevato** ***
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. A BRIEF DIACHRONIC ACCOUNT OF THE 2008
FINANCIAL CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR’S NEGATIVE
EXTERNALITIES: THE ROLE OF TAXATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE GOALS OF FINANCIAL REGULATORY TAXES AND
THEIR INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The International Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. ENTITY-BASED FINANCIAL REGULATORY TAXES . . . . . . . .
A. Risky Asset-based and Liability-based Taxes . . . . . . . . .
B. Excess-profits Financial Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. General features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The ‘Relocation’ and ‘Substitution’ Risks . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The EU Commission’s Proposal for an FTT . . . . . . . . .
VI. HOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY TAXES COMPLEMENT
DIRECT REGULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. POLICY MIX AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION . . . . . . .

603
607
610
613
613
616
619
620
624
629
629
632
634
640
645

INTRODUCTION
This Article endeavors to broaden the analysis of available policy
tools to address the problems created by financial crises and discusses
how, in addition to direct regulation, certain tax measures having a regula*
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tory nature may operate to address the so-called “negative externalities”
often associated with those crises.
There is a negative externality when an economic agent making a decision does not pay the full cost of the decision’s consequences. In such
cases, the cost to society as a whole is greater than the cost borne by the
individuals creating the economic impact. In practice, negative externalities result in market inefficiencies or failures since in most cases individuals do not fully take into account the costs of the negative externalities
created.
According to the Coase Theorem, if transaction costs are sufficiently
low and the individuals impacted by the negative externalities own property rights, an efficient outcome will prevail through negotiation.1 However, in real situations when these assumptions are not met, negative
externalities can be addressed by taxing the agents who create them, so
that the agents’ marginal cost will be increased and, correspondingly, their
output will be reduced.
Those measures that indirectly regulate agents’ behavior through taxation can be used to address the failures of the market resulting from negative externalities, such as those created by the recent financial crisis. In the
turmoil of 2008, negative externalities percolated from the financial industry to other sectors of the economy and to society as a whole, not only
directly in the form of economic damages, but also indirectly through governmental use of general tax revenue to fund the bank bailouts and other
crisis management measures.
Assessing causal relationships in complex evolutionary phenomena,
such as the economic crisis which began in the United States in 2008 and
migrated to European countries, is an arduous task. However, a consistent
strain of research points to the conclusion that one of the main contributing factors to the crisis was a lack of effective regulation of financial institutions.2 Had a more established and internationally-coordinated
1.
(1960).

See the seminal work of R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1

2.
See, for example, in the vast literature on the causes of the financial crisis: Phillip
Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY,
Spring 2009, at 14-15; Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch
2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2009, at 80-81 (discussing how certain factors
amplified the effects of the housing market collapse into other markets); RAGHURAM G.
RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY
31 (2010) (pointing to a complicity amongst regulators and bankers as contributing to the
financial collapse); Peter J. Wallison, Cause and Effect: Government Policies and the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. : J. POL. & SOC’Y. 365 (2009) (arguing that regulatory standards
were lowered); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed America’s Economy?, 21 CRITICAL REV.: J. POL. & SOC’Y 332-33 (2009); VIRAL V. ACHARYA, THOMAS
COOLEY, MATTHEW RICHARDSON, & INGO WALTER, MANUFACTURING TAIL RISK: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007–2009 (2010) (asserting that there is a consensus
around the collapse being caused by the credit boom and housing bubble); Viral V. Acharya
& Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV.: J. POL. & SOC’Y
195 (2009) (arguing that regulations were not adequate to stop the banks’ behavior); Maurice
Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Com-
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regulatory framework been in place for accountability and transparency,
the sudden collapse of financial markets would have not occurred, or its
effect would at least have been mitigated.3
Therefore, among the manifold dimensions of causal analysis of the
2008 financial crisis, it is necessary to identify how the negative externalities created by the financial industry can be mitigated, both to prevent
another crisis of such dimensions from reoccurring and to prevent the public from bearing the ultimate costs of the bailouts.
Direct regulation, which the United States pursued through the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “DoddFrank Act”) in 2010,4 is one possible approach. Regulatory taxes provide
another means of coping with negative externalities,5 and they are discussed in the next Section. This shows that the taxing power in a broad
sense has both a revenue-raising function and a regulatory function.6 This
mon Causes (Ctr. For Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP7606, 2009), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1533211. A different view is found in Keith
Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Bill Thomas, Dissenting Statement to Financial Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 413-38, at 414
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (listing ten
essential causes, with lack of regulation not among them).
3.
We draw here on the analysis developed by Michael S. Barr, one of the architects
of the Dodd-Frank Act. See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29
YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2012). An approach that essentially looks at the failure of regulation
can be found in most of the analysis that has been produced in the aftermath of the crisis.
See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 114 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/
GPO-FCIC.pdf; U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 143-55 (2011), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/public/
_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf; DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 7 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.
4.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
5.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2006);
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and
Other Regulatory Taxes, 1 ACCT., ECON. & LAW 1, 2-3 (2011) [hereinafter Taxation as
Regulation].
6.
See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937) (quoting Sonzinsky v.
United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some measure regulatory.”). See
also United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (“It is beyond serious question that a tax
does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters
the activities taxed.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has in several cases confirmed that Congress
can legitimately use its taxing power to indirectly regulate non-tax behaviors and areas that it
may not regulate directly under the “enumerated powers rule.” This position was recently
reaffirmed by Chief Justice Roberts in his controlling opinion on the constitutionality of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act (so-called “Obamacare”), when Roberts
wrote that “taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new” and cited Justice Story’s
proposition that “the taxing power is often, very often, applied for other purposes, than revenue.” National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012)
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Article will discuss the use of such taxes as applied to the financial sector,
referring to them as “financial regulatory taxes.”
The Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly describes the unfolding and the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Part II articulates an
argument for adopting regulatory taxes to address the problem of negative
externalities created by the financial sector and currently borne by the
economy and society as a whole. Part III defines the main features of the
potential architecture of such financial regulatory taxes by looking at their
principal policy goals and considering the issues arising from the need for
multilateral cooperation at the international level. Part IV then describes
the financial regulatory taxes levied on the economic outcomes of legal
entities, including risky asset-based and liability-based taxes and excessprofits taxes. Part V, in turn, describes the financial transactions tax that is
charged on actual operations in the financial markets in a broad sense.
Part VI explains how these financial regulatory taxes may interact with
and complement direct regulation in a holistic approach to the reform of
the financial sector. The Article concludes with Part VII by highlighting
how broad cooperation at the international level could rely on the policy
mix that results from the complementary application of regulatory taxes
and direct regulation.
It is important to note the regulatory taxes described in Parts III and
IV are not exclusive of one another, but, if properly designed and carefully
implemented, can be applied in combination. In such a flexible choice architecture, these taxes are potentially capable of addressing at domestic
and international levels, the three policy goals of (1) discouraging excessive risk-taking, (2) building an insurance fund available for future crisis
management, and (3) raising more revenue from the industry which creates the negative externalities, therefore achieving more redistribution and
fairness within the tax system as a whole (for details, see infra Section
III.A). Consequently, these different types of financial regulatory taxes
can be combined as a cluster of diversified incentives (for details, see infra
Section VI.).
We recognize that a proposal for the combined adoption of financial
regulatory taxes may be vulnerable to criticism concerning its sustainability by the financial industry. We are aware of the delicate equilibrium that must be carefully calibrated to prevent the broad policy
framework advanced here from suffocating the financial industry. At the
same time, however, we believe that concerns about excessive regulatory
burdens of the industry cannot preclude the development and design of
broad policies that could more effectively prevent another global crisis
from reoccurring.
Although it is not among the objectives of this work to go into the
specific details of designing and implementing optimal financial regulatory
(citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §962
(1833)). Roberts further cited Sonzinsky for the proposition that “[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as
compared with others not taxed.” Id. (quoting Sonzinsky, supra).
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taxes, there are several precautions that can and should be taken to ensure
that the implementation of regulatory taxes does not lead to undesirable,
unintended consequences. In particular, besides the proper establishment
and ongoing adjustment of minimal tax rates and tax bases, policy-makers
and governments can also opt for a gradual adoption of such measures.
Other refinements may be added as needed. In this way, the actual implementation process in the context of multilateral cooperation may, over
time, enhance and refine those proposals and turn them into sustainable
policies.
I. A BRIEF DIACHRONIC ACCOUNT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The events that unfolded in 2008 crystallized a tipping point: when the
housing market collapsed, the credit markets were almost paralyzed.
Shortly after, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Federal Reserve took major
macroeconomic measures and other specific actions.7 A number of U.S.
investment banks were consolidated by the Federal Reserve as holding
companies or went bankrupt.8 Additionally, the federal government
bailed out important banks9 and protected them under a liquidity guarantee program.10
In the EU, an imbalanced pattern of growth spurred demand so that
the region’s periphery growth—especially in Spain—was fuelled by capital
inflows from core countries—especially from Germany—and intermediated by the European financial system, which in turn was magnified by the
use of bank leverage and securitization. The public sector stepped in to fill
financing gaps with extraordinary measures, which included, in particular,
emergency support facilities. The European Central Bank took several actions, including steps to ease the tension in interbank markets and to reduce bank refinancing risks, thereby averting a severe credit crunch and
helping to ease borrowing costs for fiscally frail nations.11
Most of these measures, aimed at fixing the damages created by segments of the financial industry, resulted in serious sacrifices for countries’
public finances, as they were funded by revenue collected through general
taxation. This raised not just fiscal but also fairness concerns, both of
which still persist today. Such concerns were shared at the international
level. At the end of the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, the G20 leaders asked
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prepare a report for their next
7.
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
8.
See Brunnermeier, supra note 2, at 77, 82-91; Barr, supra note 3, at 96.
9.
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
10.
See Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 12 C.F.R. 370 2 (2008).
11.
Dermot Hodson & Lucia Quaglia, European Perspectives on the Global Financial
Crisis: Introduction, 47 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 939 (2009); Summit of the Euro Area
Countries, Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro Area Countries,
(Oct. 12, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication
13260_en.pdf.
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meeting on June 2010, “with regard to the range of options . . . as to how
the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward
paying for any burdens associated with government interventions to repair
the banking system.”12 In April of 2010, this request was subsequently expanded by the G20 finance ministers and central banks governors when
they called for the IMF to engage in “further work on options to ensure
domestic financial institutions bear the burden of any extraordinary government interventions where they occur, address their excessive risk taking and help promote a level playing field, taking into consideration
individual country’s [sic] circumstances.”13
In a report issued on June 2010 (hereinafter, “IMF Report”), the IMF
described the various measures already adopted at the domestic level by
various countries and examined the application of ‘backward-looking’
charges—such as one based on the balance sheets of financial institutions
at the beginning of the crisis—as the least distortionary way to recover the
fiscal cost of the past bailouts.14 The IMF further proposed the adoption
of two new taxes on financial institutions aimed at addressing future financial failures.15 The goal of these taxes was to reduce the systemic risk inherent in the financial sector and to raise a significant amount of
revenue.16
Despite these efforts, the G20 Toronto Summit, which was held on
June 26-27, 2010, clearly demonstrated the inability of the G20 leaders to
reach an agreement on whether and how to create a globally coordinated
tax on the financial sector. The contrast in viewpoint was insurmountable
and, at the end of the Summit, the G20 leaders simply “recognized that
there are a range of policy approaches to this end. Some countries are
pursuing a financial levy. Other countries are pursuing different
approaches.”17
The main reasons for the failure to agree had already been announced
by the G20 ministers of finance and central bank governors after their
preparatory meeting in Busan, South Korea, on June 5, 2010. At this meeting, the divide was clear. Europeans and Americans—both of which were
strongly affected by the financial crisis and by the burdens of the
12.
G20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, at 10 (Sept. 24-25, 2009), https://
g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Pittsburgh_Declaration_0.pdf.
13.
G20, Communiqué: Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, ¶ 4
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20finance100423.html.
14.
International Monetary Fund [IMF], A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the
Financial Sector: Final Report for the G-20, at 8, (June 2010), https://www.imf.org/external/np/
g20/pdf/062710b.pdf.
15.
Id. at 25-26.
16.
Id.; see also John D. Brondolo, Taxing Financial Transactions: An Assessment of
Administrative Feasibility 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/11/185, 2011), https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2011wp11185.pdf. The main features of the two taxes proposed by the
IMF—the ‘Financial Activities Tax’ and the ‘Financial Stability Contribution’—will be described in Sections IV.A and IV.B.
17.
THE G20 TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION ¶ 21 (June 27, 2010), http://www
.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communique.html#top.
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bailouts—pushed for the adoption of a globally coordinated tax. Countries
that had not been particularly affected by the crisis were against the imposition of a new tax on their domestic banks, none of which had benefitted
from any government aid, and instead supported the maintenance of traditional regulatory measures.18
To further regulate the financial sector in the United States, Congress
enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.19 The Dodd-Frank Act adopted a
sweeping regulatory approach consisting of three main actions: (i) improved management of systemic risk through a federal authority, including
clear procedures for the winding down of Systemically Important Financial
Institutions (“SIFIs”); (ii) regulation of the components of “shadow banking” markets,20 such as derivatives, repurchase agreements (“repos”), and
securitizations; and (iii) establishment of a consumer financial protection
agency.21
Although the U.S. economy has arguably recovered from the 2008 crisis and some authoritative voices in the financial industry have begun lobbying for the relaxation of Dodd-Frank regulations which they consider to
be too invasive, we strongly believe that there is still a need for sound
regulation of the financial sector, because the threat of another financial
18.
This explanation is strongly implied by reports of the conference. See, e.g., World
Finance Ministers Rule Out Global Bank Tax, FRANCE 24 (June 5, 2010), http://www.france24
.com/en/20100605-G20-bank-bailouts-public-debt-budget-tax-south-korea-summit. This scenario has been diplomatically summarized by the final joint statement of the Busan meeting,
in which it is explained that the G20 ministers of finance and central bank governors agreed
to develop common strategies “taking into account individual country’s circumstances and
options.” G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Busan, S. Kor.,
June 5, 2010, Communiqué, at 2, http://www.oecd.org/env/45425658.pdf. In addition, competition between countries in attracting capital and investments may also have played a decisive
role in the failure of the international community to reach an agreement. Some countries
may have been interested in becoming a ‘financial tax haven’ to attract financial institutions,
at the expenses of other countries, relying on the belief that the latter, in the absence of an
international agreement, would still implement a new domestic tax on the institutions established within their territories. In the United States, for example, the Obama Administration
had already advanced, in January 2010, its unilateral proposal for the implementation of a
national liability-based levy on large financial institutions (this proposal will be discussed in
Section IV.A). This type of scenario already manifested in 1998, when the OECD failed to
enforce a substantial tax harmonization plan due to the unwillingness of certain jurisdictions
to renounce the opportunity to attract investors from high-tax countries by offering them a
lower level of taxation. See Richard T. Page, Foolish Revenge or Shrewd Regulation? Financial-Industry Tax Law Reforms Proposed in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, 85 TUL. L. REV.
191, 207 (2010).
19.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
20.
This measure has already been discussed. See, e.g., Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song
Shin, The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation, Fed. Res. Bank of
New York Staff Reports, No. 382 (2009).
21.
Barr, supra note 3, at 92. Similar actions were taken in Europe. See, e.g., Charles
A. E. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 4 J. FIN. STAB. 351 (2008);
James Buckley & David Howarth, Internal Market: Gesture Politics? Explaining the EU’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 48 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 119 (2010).
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crisis may still exist.22 The severe and ongoing consequences of the 2008
crisis on the EU economy demonstrate that every effort must be made to
prevent a potential future financial crisis of such a dimensions.
II.

ADDRESSING

THE

FINANCIAL SECTOR’S NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES:
THE ROLE OF TAXATION

The preliminary question to address here is whether taxes should ever
be used to regulate behavior. The standard answer to this question is that
they should not because of “tax neutrality,” according to which tax measures are efficient (“neutral”) as long as they do not alter the relative
prices/costs of goods, services, or any other economic activity.23 Under this
conception of neutrality, when tax measures alter relative prices and preferences of economic actors, they give rise to tax-affected decisions that are
considered ‘distorted’ because they produce a lower welfare than that
which would result in their absence.24 This is true not only when tax measures take the form of actual taxes, but also when they take the form of socalled “tax-expenditures.”25 Thus, in light of the tax neutrality principle,
the standard view is that direct regulation and government subsidies
should be the exclusive tools to regulate behaviors.
A robust argument in favor of taxes that indirectly regulate behaviors
can, however, be made if one looks at the failures of the market that take
the form of negative externalities as defined at the beginning of the Article. The English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou was the first to fully develop the argument that taxes may constitute efficient market-based
22.
See Floyd Norris, Financial Crisis, Over and Already Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/business/the-financial-crisis-already-forgotten
.html?_r=1.
23.
See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 19 (9th ed. 2010);
David Hasen, Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities 12 FLA. TAX REV. 57, 77-78 (2012).
24.
Such an argument is based on Adam Smith’s classic theory of the invisible hand of
the market. To illustrate the significance of such an approach, it is worth mentioning that its
“orthodox” supporters oppose, in principle, even the implementation of the basic, traditional
individual or corporate income tax. This is because even if income taxes were applied at a flat
rate on the income of every person (and without being subject to any statutory exclusions,
credits, or special rates), they would still distort economic actors’ free preferences and decisions, since they would alter the relative prices of work and leisure. Thus, advocates of pure
tax neutrality identify a lump-sum tax–that is, a head tax imposed without regard to the
taxpayers’ conduct–as the “optimal theoretical tax.” Hasen, supra note 23, at 79-80. Nevertheless, the actual implementation of a lump-sum tax is, for obvious reasons, affected by
serious questions of political feasibility.
25.
By “tax expenditures,” the literature refers to those forms of indirect government
spending implemented by means of statutory or regulatory rules, such as tax exclusions, deductions, credits, deferrals or special tax rates. Stanley Surrey, in his seminal works on tax
expenditures, advanced the argument that they are basically aimed at encouraging, rewarding, and providing financial assistance to certain types of economic or social activities
and are wide-spread among the tax systems of all developed countries, further complicating
the tax system and tax code in a way that can inhibit the achievement of their natural objectives such as raising revenue and redistributing wealth. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R.
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM:
THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURE 6 (1973).
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instruments to induce economic actors to internalize negative externalities
that the actors generate.26 These taxes are thus generally denominated
“Pigouvian taxes” and impose a burden on the agents that is equal to the
cost of the negative externalities that they generate. The result is that
agents affected by Pigouvian taxes are induced to take into account the
entire economic cost of their activities and are therefore incentivized to
change their behavior to reduce the negative externalities.27
Pigouvian taxes can be applied, for example, to carbon emissions.
There is wide consensus that the command-and-control approach is limited.28 Some countries have therefore adopted “carbon taxes” of a
Pigouvian nature, but never has an international body been successful at
promoting such an approach.29 Another example of successful use of taxation for regulatory purposes can be found in “sin taxes” levied on items
like alcohol and tobacco, whose consumption results in costs for the entire
society—like additional health care costs—and neither the sellers nor the
consumers account for such costs through their selling and purchasing
activities.30
26.
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-98 (4th ed., 1932). On externalities, see, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES,
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 39 (1996); A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder,
Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in 3 HANDBOOK PUB. ECON. 1471, 1477-90 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); Gloria E. Helfand, Peter Berck & Tim Maull, The
Theory of Pollution Policy, 1 HANDBOOK ENVTL. ECON. 249 (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey R.
Vincent eds., 2003).
27.
On the concept of Pigouvian taxes, see, e.g., Agnar Sandmo, Pigouvian taxes, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Lawrence E. Blume & Steven N.
Durlauf eds., 2nd ed., 2008); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 21014 (5th ed. 2009); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 651-60
(7th Ed. 2009); ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 354-56 (1995); JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES (4th ed. 2008); LEONARD E.
BURMAN & JOEL SLEMROD, TAXES IN AMERICA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 13
(2012); Andy H. Barnett, The Pigouvian Tax Rule Under Monopoly, 70 AM. ECON. REV.
1037 (1980).
28.
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 5, at 4.
29.
For a discussion of this institutional gap, see Igor Bashmakov, Catrinus Jepma, et
al., Policies, Measures, and Instruments, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 399 (2001), http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/
pdf/6.pdf; ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 2-3 (2010). The
failure to achieve a binding international agreement on the implementation of an internationally-coordinated environmental policy affected the ability of local measures to achieve
their policy goals. See, e.g., Yoram Margalioth, Tax Policy Analysis of Climate Change,64 Tax
L. Rev. 63, 72-74 (2010); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 540 (2009).
30.
For a good analysis of sin taxation, see Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 (10) J. PUB. ECON. 1825 (2006); see also BURMAN & SLEMROD, supra note
27, at 96-97.
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The basic idea behind the use of market-based tools to correct negative externalities is that individual countries and the international community as a whole should take actions that have the greatest margin of social
benefit over the social costs that are required to generate the benefits.31
Within this policy approach, the social costs are essentially those that can
be imposed on the financial sector, while the social benefits consist of the
elimination of negative externalities created by the financial sector.
The policy question that follows is how, beyond imposing regulations,
policymakers can incentivize financial firms to prevent unacceptable risk
and prevent the generation of negative externalities. A potential solution,
if properly designed, could take the form of a market-based mechanism,
implemented by governments and international institutions, which imposes costs on the financial actors whose behaviors create such negative
externalities. Thus, financial regulatory taxes can constitute an efficient
market-based solution insofar as they impose additional costs on certain
financial actors’ excessive risk-taking behavior equal to the negative externalities generated by such behavior.32
Such financial regulatory taxes would result in risk-intense financial
products and activities including in their price the entire cost of financial
risk for the public at large, and this, in turn, would lower the price of nonrisk-intense financial products, thereby reducing the overall amount of
negative externalities and preventing, or significantly limiting, the rise of a
new systemic crisis. The additional costs imposed through financial regulatory taxes would provide signals to firms to move to relatively low-risk
products in order to increase their profits by reducing their costs. Moreover, those additional costs would give market incentives to firms that are
financial innovators to develop and introduce low-risk financial products.
Financial regulatory taxes would also provide signals to consumers about
which financial products to purchase.
In addition, these financial regulatory taxes could give rise to a significant amount of revenue that, as illustrated in Part II, could be used to
31.
It is quite difficult to determine the exact amount of costs related to negative externalities to be attributed to each financial product or activity in the market, so one must
generally rely on causal indicators of a risky financial product by using baseline situations as
a benchmark. For instance, as it will be illustrated in the next paragraphs, excessive risktaking and excessive remuneration by firms, together with excessive price volatility in relation to the trades carried out by such firms, are indicators of potential negative externalities.
32.
Some policy makers and scholars believe that traditional regulation failed to prevent the last crisis as such regulation was not capable, alone, of dealing with the financial
sector’s macro-prudential externalities and that new market-based tools such as regulatory
taxation might help deal with such externalities. See, e.g., IMF, supra note 14, at 47-50;
Michael Keen, The Taxation and Regulation of Banks 6 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/11/206,
Aug. 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11206.pdf; see also Avi-Yonah,
Taxation as Regulation, supra note 5, at 9 (highlighting that the experience shows that “taxation as regulation makes sense when (1) it is applied to small numbers of taxpayers, (2) the
taxpayers are sophisticated and able to deal with complex tax incentives, [and] (3) the regulatory goal is clear and related to the level of the tax,” concluding that all of these criteria seem
to be met upon looking at the financial industry and its externalities).
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create insurance-like funds so that the burden of future crisis management
measures would not be borne by the general taxpayer.
In sum, financial regulatory taxes come close to an optimal tax for the
financial sector: they are economically efficient because they reduce the
output of undesirable financial activities, and, at the same time, they are
capable of preventing the use of general revenue to rescue financial
institutions.
III.

GOALS

OF

FINANCIAL REGULATORY TAXES
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

AND

THEIR

Policy-makers can establish a “choice architecture” (in short, an “architecture”)33 by structuring the framework in which economic actors
make certain choices in the global financial markets. Such choices are
dominated by manifold forms of rational decisions combined with “irrational exuberance,” to use Robert Shiller’s words.34 Regulatory taxes constitute a dimension of the choice architecture insofar as they alter actors’
behavior by changing their incentives.
There are three layers of this choice architecture of financial regulatory taxes: first, different goals can be pursued by different types of taxes,
alone or in combination; second, financial regulatory taxes are by nature
global and therefore require the concerted effort of governments at the
international level; third, financial regulatory taxes do not operate in isolation and complement the direct regulatory approach.
The first two layers of this choice architecture—their goals and their
international dimension—are illustrated next in Sections II.A and II.B.
The third layer—the interaction between financial regulatory taxes and
traditional direct regulation—is examined through the use of concrete examples in Part VI after the description of the main types of financial regulatory taxes.
A.

Goals

As mentioned in Part I, there are three potential goals of implementing financial regulatory taxes: (i) they can discourage excessive risk-taking
conduct; (ii) they can create an insurance-like system in the event of defaults or a new systemic crisis; and (iii) they can raise revenue from the
industry, which creates negative externalities, therefore achieving more redistribution and fairness within the tax system as a whole.
First, financial regulatory taxes can discourage excessive risk-taking
conduct, which results from various factors that are compounded together.
33.
Here, we borrow the approach of RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 11-13, 83-87
(2008), acknowledging the difference that regulatory taxes, unlike “nudges,” do alter actors’
incentives.
34.
See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 132-146 (2006) (discussing reactions by investors to market changes); see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT
MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 169 (2010).
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Among others, these factors include high leveraging, the holding of risky
assets, short-term financial speculation leading to excessive price volatility
(especially in the derivative markets), lack of transparency in the shadow
banking system, lax oversight, and a compensation structure for employees that incentivizes short-term strategies.35
Regulatory taxes may reduce excessive risk by imposing a cost commensurate to the risk-creating activities, but, of course, different types of
taxes can address the different facets of excessive financial risk. The different types of taxes, as this Article will demonstrate, may operate in combination with one another. For example, volatility may be addressed by
financial transaction taxes, while high leveraging may be addressed by liability-based taxes, and, in general, excessively high risk-creating firms may
be subject to an excess-profits tax.36 In turn, these manifold dimensions of
excessive financial risk can be subject to direct regulation, and there may
be synergies with respect to each of them resulting from the combined
operation of regulatory taxes and direct regulation, as will be illustrated in
Part VI.
The second goal of financial regulatory taxes is to create an insurancelike system in the event of defaults or a new systemic crisis. If properly
designed, certain regulatory taxes, just like insurance premiums, can be
collected on the basis of the contribution of each firm to the creation of
risks. Thus, a fund available to finance future crisis management would
reflect the actual causal contributions of those firms to the negative externalities and provide available resources without exclusively relying on general tax revenues. This is another Pigouvian facet of regulatory taxes but
one that is ancillary to the core goal of discouraging excessive risk.
The establishment of insurance funds raises concerns of moral hazard,
as firms may decide to engage in riskier investments because of the insurance coverage provided by those funds. The massive government bailouts
after 2008 already generated moral hazard, because such bailouts led actors to believe that they are implicitly insured by the public. There, however, the risk was covered by general taxpayer money, which did not take
part in the creation of risk.37 By contrast, with ad hoc insurance funds,
those actors who causally contributed to the generation of risk would
cover the risk.
Finally, financial regulatory taxes, like ordinary taxes, imply the collection by tax authorities of sums paid by taxpayers, so their inescapable

35.
See John Vella, Clemens Fuest & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, The EU Commission’s
Proposal for a Financial Transaction Tax, 6 BRITISH TAX REVIEW 607, 619 (2011); Michael
Devereux, Clemens Fuest & Giorgia Maffini, The G20 and New Bank Taxes. A Briefing
Note, 1-2, OXFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR BUS. TAXATION (Apr. 20, 2010), http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac
.uk/3539/1/the_G20_and_new_bank_taxes.pdf.
36.
The main features of the financial regulatory taxes are described, respectively, in
Parts IV and V.
37.

Devereux, Fuest & Maffini, supra note 35, at 2.
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effect is to raise revenue.38 However, financial regulatory tax revenues are
different from ordinary tax revenues in that they are earmarked to fulfill
specific goals, essentially to offset the cost of negative externalities that
spillover on the taxpayers as a whole. This revenue-raising is therefore
important because of its unique redistributive effects: as already highlighted, the crisis was attributable to segments of the financial industry,
but the revenue used to bail out the largest financial institutions was collected through the taxes paid by all taxpayers, who clearly were not responsible for the crisis. Regulatory taxes would thus extract revenue from
the financial sector to be redistributed to the public.
Extracting more revenue from the financial industry is also based on a
broader fairness argument—the financial sector, in addition to potentially
generating massive negative externalities, also benefits from generous tax
privileges which lead to under-taxation of the financial sector in comparison to other industries.39 Tax systems, for example, exempt most financial
services from the value added taxes,40 or allow the deductibility of financial costs such as the service debt as opposed to the cost of equity41 or bad
loan reserves.42 In other cases, the groups of companies can consolidate
losses.43 These features are compounded by aggressive tax planning by
financial institutions aimed at profit shifting.44 So if the financial sector
38.
Daniel Shaviro, The Financial Transactions Tax Versus (?) the Financial Activities
Tax 21-22 (N.Y.U. Law and Econ. Working Papers, Working Paper No. 292, Mar. 2012),
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/292; Thornton Matheson, Financial Sector Taxation and the
Ongoing Financial Crisis, in TAXING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: FINANCIAL TAXES, BANK LEVIES AND MORE 203 (Otto Marres & Dennis Weber eds., 2012); see also Devereux, Fuest &
Maffini, supra note 35, at 1.
39.

Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 5, at 9.

40.
Harry Huizinga, A European VAT on Financial Services?, 17 ECON. POL’Y 499,
499 (2002); Harry Grubert & James Mackie, Must Financial Services Be Taxed Under a Consumption Tax?, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 23, 23 (2000); Satya Poddar & Morley English, Taxation of
Financial Services Under a Value-Added Tax: Applying the Cash-Flow Approach, 50 NAT’L
TAX J. 89, 89 (1997).
41.
While the regulation system aims to mitigate the use of debt finance, the corporate
tax system favors debt finance over equity finance by granting a passive debt interest deduction but not allowing for a cost-of-equity deduction. Harry Huizinga, Luc Laeven & Gaetan
Nicodeme, Capital Structure and International Debt Shifting, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 80, 81 (2008).
There have been various proposals and attempts to eliminate this disparity of tax treatment
between debt capital and equity capital, above all in the United States, by entirely repealing
the deductibility of debt interest but none of them have succeeded due to questions of political practicability (basically, the resistance from the financial lobbies in eliminating such a
privilege). See Tim Edgar, Jonathan Farras & Amin Mawant, Foreign Direct Investment, Thin
Capitalization, and the Interest Expense Deduction: A Policy Analysis, 56 CAN. TAX J. 803,
810 (2008); Tim Edgar, Policy Forum: Interest Deductibility Restrictions—Expecting Too
Much from REOP?, 52 CAN. TAX J. 1130 (2004).
42.

Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 5, at 9.

43.
See Dennis R. Post & Kelly P. Stals, The Tax Treatment of Corporate Losses: A
Comparative Study, 40 INTERTAX 232 (2012).
44.
On the global issue of profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions through
aggressive tax planning, see, e.g., Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Addressing
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013) (addressing the global issue of profit shifting from
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contributes too little to public finances when compared to the contributions of other industries, fairness demands that the financial sector also
pay its dues.45
B.

The International Dimension

The negative externalities addressed by financial regulatory taxes are
truly global because of the complex network effect of the financial economy.46 The elimination of these financial negative externalities would, in
theory, make national communities everywhere better off and thus generate a global public good which would be non-excludable, because each
country would not be prevented from enjoying it, and non-rival, because
the enjoyment by each country would not infringe on the enjoyment by
other countries.47
There are different methods available to pursue global public goods,
such as (1) the effort of just one or more self-interested agents (“single
high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions through aggressive tax planning); see also OECD, Corporate
Loss Utilisation Through Aggressive Tax Planning (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/97892641
19222-en; Kimberly A. Clausing, The Revenue Effects of Multinational Firm Income Shifting,
28 TAX NOTES 1580 (2011); Dhammika Dharmapala & Nadine Riedel, Earnings Shocks and
Tax-Motivated Income-Shifting: Evidence from European Multinationals, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 95
(2013); Clemens Fuest & Nadine Riedel, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance in Developing
Countries: The Role of International Profit Shifting, (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation,
Working Paper No. 10/12, 2010), available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Busi
ness_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_10/WP1012.pdf.
45.
This sentiment is well expressed by the words of President Obama in announcing
his Administration’s proposal for a levy on financial institutions (discussed infra in Section
IV.A). He emphasized that his “commitment [was] to recover every single dime the American people are owed” and said, “My determination to achieve this goal is only heightened
when I see reports of massive profits and obscene bonuses at the very firms who owe their
continued existence to the American people.” See Press Release, The White House, President Obama Proposes Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee to Recoup Every Last Penny for
American Taxpayers (Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidentobama-proposes-financial-crisis-responsibility-fee-recoup-every-last-penn. Similarly, Columbia University’s Jeffrey Sachs, in manifesting his support for a financial transactions tax
(whose features are discussed infra at Part V), claimed that such a tax would properly burden
a financial sector that was “under-taxed,” “out of control,” and was enjoying huge profits—
even during the financial crisis—at the expense of the general public. “Bankers,” he concluded, “are brazenly smirking as they pocket large amounts of our money.” Larry Elliott,
Sachs calls Calls For Robin Hood tax on ‘Tax On ‘Smirking’ Wall Street, THE GUARDIAN,
(Mar. 9, 2010) http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/09/jeffrey-sachs-robin-hoodtax.
46.
See, e.g., MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE 7 (Wiley-Blackwell 2d ed. 2011); Shiller,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 34, at 132-134.
47.
For a discussion on global public goods, see SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?
THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 1-22 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007); DAVIS
B. BOBROW & MARK A. BOYER, DEFENSIVE INTERNATIONALISM: PROVIDING PUBLIC
GOODS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 1-5 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2005); Marco Ferroni & Ashoka
Mody, Global Incentives for International Public Goods: Introduction and Overview, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS: INCENTIVES, MEASUREMENT AND FINANCING 1, 1-28 (Marco
Ferroni & Ashoka Mody eds., 2002).
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best effort” methods),48 (2) universal cooperation of all agents when the
weakest agent’s failure could frustrate collective efforts (“weakest link”
methods),49 (3) mutual restraint50 or mere technical coordination by
agents,51 and (4) comprehensive and coordinated interaction of most of
the agents (hereinafter, “aggregate effort,” or more generally, “multilateral cooperation”).52
However, the global public good consisting of the elimination of financial negative externalities can only be obtained through the aggregate effort of the involved countries. The methods enumerated above either are
not, on their own, sufficient or are not practically feasible. No single selfinterested agent is capable of preventing externalities globally. There is no
need to include even the weakest link (the country that can minimally
contribute to the reform). Moreover, global financial reform clearly is not
a question of mere technical coordination or of mutual restraint.
Where at a domestic level a public good such as the elimination of
financial negative externalities can be achieved through the compulsory
means of legal systems, at an international level no such exercise of legal
force is attainable. Indeed, the institutions that domestic systems currently
rely on to supply public good do not exist at the global level. The consequence is that, lacking supranational authority, elimination of global financial negative externalities must be attained voluntarily through
multilateral cooperation.
Such cooperation is difficult to pursue for a variety of reasons. First,
countries are affected in different ways by waves of financial negative externalities. Second, mitigating those externalities is expensive, both in
terms of the costs necessary to reach an agreement and in terms of potential opportunity costs due to the diversion of financial resources from investments that might yield higher benefits than the reduction of
externalities. Third, the implicit need of the aggregate effort of virtually all
the involved countries creates the opportunity for free riding by a few
countries that could benefit from such efforts without contributing their
own resources.
Therefore, when regulatory taxes are considered at the multi-country
level, one could envisage a two-stage model to ensure the final goal of
reduction of financial negative externalities. In the first stage, countries
48.
An example of “single best effort” is a world calamity in which a single agent has
the capability of saving itself and the other agents, in light of the fact that there is no other
agent that has such capability. See generally Barrett, supra note 47.
49.
An example of “weakest link” is the eradication of an infectious disease, which
requires action by even the weakest agent. See id. at 990-1466.
50.
An example of mutual restraint is the limitation on the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. See id. at 2462-2506.
51.
An example of mere technical coordination is the establishment of common standards, such as those for aviation. See id. at 2759-85.
52.
Aggregate efforts are generally used when other methods to pursue public goods
cannot be adopted because of the complexity of the agenda to be pursued (for example, in
the case of climate change). See id. at 1468-1520.
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would resort to unilateral strategies to reduce those negative externalities
through national regulatory taxes with extraterritorial reach. In the second
stage, countries would abide by common binding rules that prevent opportunistic free riding by non-cooperating agents.
In the first stage, individual countries can exercise their extra-territorial jurisdiction and apply their financial regulatory taxes on a worldwide
basis on resident firms. Of course, in an interdependent world, there are
major obstacles for individual countries, regardless of their size or importance, to unilaterally enforcing their regulatory tax policies regarding the
financial sector.53 Global players tend to avoid the unilateral regulatory
taxes enacted by individual countries by using aggressive strategies based
on the natural mobility of financial transactions, taking advantage of information mismatches. Moreover, there are obvious incentives for jurisdictions to relax their own regulatory taxes in order to attract capital and
investments.54
The unilateral regulatory tax strategies that may be adopted by individual countries are especially vulnerable because they are exposed to (1)
the substitution of taxable transactions with non-taxable transactions
(“substitution effect”) and (2) the relocation of transactions or firms subject to the regulatory taxes of other jurisdictions that do not impose such
taxes (“relocation effect”). The most effective tool to counteract such opportunistic behaviour is for governments to act multilaterally and fully exchange information on the enforcement of regulatory taxes. Secrecy and
lack of access to information are key enablers of un-cooperative behavior
by countries that are used by firms to pursue relocation effects and prevent multilaterality.55 Governments thus assign strategic value to tax information that concerns situations occurring outside their territorial reach,
which specifically result in relocation effects, and therefore need information about relevant transactions relocated to favorable jurisdictions. Countries that, by exerting political pressure on these favorable jurisdictions,
actually manage to obtain such information would be capable of counter53.
As highlighted by Zürn, “in a denationalized world ruled by a system of formally
independent nation-states . . . there is a danger that political communities will be unable to
reach a desired goal owing to conditions outside their jurisdiction.” Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State, in DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE: THE EUROPEAN DILEMMA AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER 91, 93 (Michale Th. Greven & Louis
W. Pauly eds., 2000).
54.
These jurisdictions are generally defined as “offshore financial centers.” See, e.g.,
MARK P. HAMPTON & JASON P. ABBOTT, OFFSHORE FINANCE CENTERS AND TAX HAVENS:
THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL (Mark P. Hampton & Jason P. Abbott eds., 1999; Ahmed
Zoromé, Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an Operational Definition (IMF
Working Paper No. WP/07/87, 2007); Julian S. Alworth & Donato Masciandaro, Public policy: offshore centres and tax competition: the harmful problem, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRIME:
TERRORISM, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND OFFSHORE CENTRES 181 (Donato Masciandaro ed.,
2004); JACK A. BLUM ET AL., BANKING SECRECY AND FINANCIAL HAVENS (1998); Marcel
Cassard, The Role of Offshore Centers in International Financial Intermediation, (IMF Working Paper No. WP/94/107, 1994); Donato Masciandaro, Offshore Financial Centres: The Political Economy of Regulation, 26 EUROP. J. LAW ECON. 307, 312 (2008).
55.
See generally BLUM ET AL., supra note 54.
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acting the free-riding behavior of other countries that are willing to host
relocated transactions which are taken out from the global reach of the
financial transaction tax. However, given the growing interconnection of
financial markets, countries’ policies are increasingly influenced by external factors and, at the same time, individual countries cannot ignore the
potential implications their conduct may have on the global market. This
initial stage must therefore be followed by a second stage, in which comprehensive and coordinated interaction of most of the countries (multilateral cooperation) is pursued at the international level to prevent
substitution and relocation effects and to achieve common goals.
Jurisdictions which host leading financial markets tend to be reluctant
to adopt common measures, while other jurisdictions may be interested in
becoming financial offshore centers.56 There is, nevertheless, a sound reason why countries can be expected to cooperate in enforcing financial regulatory taxes. In a globalized financial market, each country, depending on
its circumstances, can import negative externalities from other non-compliant countries or export negative externalities to other compliant countries. Countries thereby realize that this problem might be remedied by
cooperation based on reciprocity achieved through communication and
backed by commitment.
Reciprocity can be understood in this context by using a game theory
approach.57 In a multi-player situation, countries initially develop their
own unilateral regulatory taxes, and then consider the reactions of other
countries over time. In practice, initial bilateral interactions between pairs
of countries and subsequent multilateral coordinated interactions among
many countries are two progressive phases of a comprehensive process.
When some form of this multilateral cooperation is achieved among
different countries, in the short term free-riding jurisdictions may continue
to import or export negative externalities through not abiding by common
rules. In the long term, however, cooperation among the other countries,
complemented by other government measures such as those as described
in Part VI (for example, denial of treaty benefits and sanctions), would
exert pressure on free riders to end harmful behavior.
IV.

ENTITY-BASED FINANCIAL REGULATORY TAXES

The conclusion that may be drawn from the discussion above is that
the architecture of financial regulatory taxes would potentially alter actors’ behavior by changing their incentives, therefore discouraging exces56.
On this type of competitions among jurisdictions, see Page, supra note 18, at 207.
Often the attraction of investment is fuelled by generous tax reductions. See, e.g., John Christensen & Mark P. Hampton, The Economics of Offshore: Who Wins, Who Loses?, 4 THE
FINANCIAL REGULATOR 24 (2000); Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which
Countries Become Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1058 (2009); Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley
& James R. Hines Jr., Do Tax Havens Divert Economic Activity?, 90 ECON. LETTERS 219
(2006).
57.
See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1831, 1858 (2002) (proposing game theory in international law).
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sive risk-taking and raising funds to build an insurance-like fund generated
by risk contributors available for any future crisis management. The collection of more revenue from the financial industry would also achieve
more redistribution and fairness in the overall tax system. This architecture could be implemented at an international level to achieve a global
public good and should be enforced by national tax systems in compliance
with international agreements to engage in multilateral cooperation.
It is quite difficult to conceive of a single proposed tax capable of attaining all of the above policy goals, but different types of regulatory taxes
may be combined to achieve them. In particular, in the past few years,
policy makers and scholars have focused on three models: (1) taxes paid
by financial companies on risky assets or liabilities; (2) taxes paid by financial companies on excess profits; and (3) taxes levied on specifically
targeted transactions that involve the trading of financial instruments.
The first two types of taxes, illustrated in Sections III.A and III.B, are
entity based, that is, they are imposed directly on financial institutions.
Such taxes are backward looking—based on balance sheets and administered by firms on a year-to-year basis. The third type of financial regulatory taxes, illustrated in Part V, is not a levy on financial institutions per
se; it is a charge on specific transactions that are previously designated as
taxable by the legislator. In essence, it is a levy collected by the firms on
behalf of the government on continuous transactions within the market.
So the architecture of financial regulatory taxes is defined by attainment
of the three policy goals described in Section II.A through any combination of the types of regulatory taxes that will be discussed in Parts III and
IV.
A.

Risky Asset-based and Liability-based Taxes

A regulatory tax can be imposed as a tax paid by financial firms on
specific balance sheet positions on either risk-weighted assets or on liabilities. A tax on risk-weighted assets is levied on certain assets of the financial statement on the basis of their risk as measured by a weighted
formula. The burden of a tax on risk-weighted assets becomes more substantial for institutions that hold more risky assets. For example, as suggested by the IMF, such a tax could be imposed on internationally defined
level 2 and level 3 trading assets—“those assets not readily marked to
market using observed prices, which could serve to discourage the buildup
of assets that proved less liquid during the crisis.”58
A risky asset-based tax is justified if one believes that one of the main
reasons for the recent crisis was the engagement of banks and other finan58.
IMF, supra note 14, at 17. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 157: FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS (2006), http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175823288587&
blobheader=application/pdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs; BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (rev. June 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189
.pdf.
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cial institutions in high risk taking investments. Adopting such a tax would
also facilitate multilateral cooperation on a global level and reduce the
costs of compliance because the definitions of level 2 and level 3 trading
assets are defined internationally. A tax on risk-weighted liabilities is levied on certain liabilities because they represent financial exposure, and
therefore a firm’s tax burden would increase as the proportion of such
liabilities held by the firm increased. For example, the IMF suggests that
such a tax should be imposed on uninsured liabilities, should exclude tier 1
capital and insured liabilities, and its rate should explicitly reflect systemic
risk.59 The liability-based levy would, therefore, provide incentives to reduce the financial firms’ excessive leverage, which is regarded as one of
the most significant threats to the stability of the financial sector. Tier 1
capital should be excluded from the tax base so that the accumulation of
equity capital is not discouraged.
As to insured liabilities, there are three main reasons for their exclusion from the tax base. First, they represent stable sources of funding since
they are covered by deposit insurance.60 Second, they are assumed to be
risk free, so that taxing them would be contrary to the concept of making
the firms’ tax liability proportionate to their contribution to systemic risk
and potential cost in the event of default.61 Third, firms already pay insurance premiums on insured liabilities so that a tax levied on those liabilities
results in a double imposition.
A tax on risk-weighted liabilities can also be designed with a narrower
scope (a smaller tax base), which includes only short-term liabilities. The
logic behind this scope is that that reliance on short-term uninsured funding was one of the main contributing causes of the recent financial crisis.
The main goal of such a tax on short-term liabilities is to induce banks and
other institutions to “internalize the negative systemic effects of fragile
funding strategies”62 rather than to provoke de-leveraging across the
board. Such a narrower base may, however, increase the risk of arbitrage
and may introduce distortionary effects resulting from investment decisions affected by the tax on the liabilities.63
For example, the IMF embraced the payment of tax on risk-weighted
liabilities in its June 2010 Report, stating that “backward-looking” levies
are the least distortionary way to recover the fiscal cost of the past
bailouts.64 The IMF therefore advanced a proposal of Financial Stability
Contribution [FSC]—a liability-based levy whose main goal is to pay for
the cost of future government support to the financial sector. Another goal
pursued by the FSC is to prevent banks from highly leveraging and from
59.
See IMF, supra note 14, at 14, 57.
60.
See THE WHITE HOUSE, FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSIBILITY FEE (2010), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/financial_responsibility_fee_fact_sheet.pdf.
61.
See IMF, supra note 14, at 17.
62.
Enrico Perotti & Javier Suarez, Liquidity Risk Charges as a Macroprudential Tool,
40 CEPR POL’Y INSIGHT 3 (2009).
63.
See IMF, supra note 14, at 17.
64.
See id. at 4 and 8.

622

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 36:603

becoming too large.65 In the IMF’s view, the FSC is complementary to
another regulatory tax denominated the “Financial Activities Tax” (see
infra Section I.B.).
According to the IMF Report, the proceeds of the FSC are attributed
to the general revenue accumulated in a specific fund. In the latter case,
the FSC provides the financial sector with an insurance-like system, as the
premium paid by each firm is proportional to the size and the level of its
risk and available to governments to establish a resolution fund for a future crisis.66
One example of this type of tax is the U.S. proposal for a levy based
on risk-weighted liabilities. On January 2010, President Obama proposed
as part of the 2011 fiscal budget the implementation of a 0.15% levy on the
largest financial institutions’ uninsured liabilities, referred to as the “Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee.”67 According to the Treasury’s original
estimations, such a levy was supposed to raise about 117 billion dollars
over 12 years in order to pay back taxpayers for the extraordinary assistance provided by the Troubled Asset Relief Program [TARP].68
However, this proposal was not enacted despite repeated presentations to
Congress in the 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 fiscal budgets. The proposal for the implementation of a fee on large, highly-leveraged financial
institutions also is included in the 2016 budget.
The proposal as of 2016 does not vary substantially from the original
proposal included in the 2011 budget, except that the proposal does not
tag the revenue from the tax as a means to pay back TARP. Rather, the
declared goal of the tax is now the general prevention of future financial
crises. In addition, the tax is no longer named “Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee.”69
65.

See id. at 5, 25-26, 54.

66.

See id. at 50.

67.
See FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSIBILITY FEE, supra note 60; see also Page, supra
note 18, at 197.
68.
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, supra note 9 (establishing
Troubled Asset Relief Program) [hereinafter “TARP”].
69.
The estimated revenue resulting from such a tax over a ten-year period has fluctuated as follows: (1) in the 2012 budget, the estimated revenue was cut to 30 billion dollars; (2)
in the 2013 budget, the estimated revenue was approximately 61 billion dollars; (3) in the
2014 budget, the estimated revenue was approximately 59 billion dollars and; (4) in the 2015
budget, the estimated revenue was approximately 56 billion dollars: (5) in the 2016 budget,
the estimated revenue increased to 112 billion dollars. See THE WHITE HOUSE, FISCAL YEAR
2012 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 23 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
BUDGET-2012-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, FISCAL YEAR
2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 26, 165 (2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
BUDGET-2013-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2013-BUD.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, FISCAL YEAR
2014 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 18-19 (2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
BUDGET-2014-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2014-BUD.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, FISCAL YEAR
2015 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 190 (Table S-9) (2014) (showing a line item in the
budget for the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET2015-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2015-BUD.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 55 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
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The Obama proposal explicitly manifests the goal of discouraging excessive risk-taking conduct, therefore sharing the regulatory approach of
the model of liability-based levy. In fact, the proposed tax imposed on the
uninsured liabilities would provide firms with incentives to reduce their
debt-to-equity ratio. Moreover, the tax would be applicable only to large
institutions with more than 50 billion dollars in consolidated assets.70 As a
result, this would deter financial firms from increasing or maintaining their
size. One negative side effect of this threshold is that it would not provide
smaller institutions with incentives to lower their debt-to-equity ratio,
which in most cases can be as high as the larger firms.
The Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee, as initially conceived, would
have covered only those institutions that were recipients or indirect beneficiaries of financial aid programs established by the government for the
purposes of limiting the impact of the financial crisis.71 This limitation had
been subject to criticism, because the large firms that benefited from the
TARP were returning their financing so that TARP was apparently paying
for itself with no need to resort to a tax to redistribute its costs.72 These
claims have also been fueled by, as mentioned above, the Obama Administration’s significant cut (from 117 billion to 30 billion) of the revenue
expected to arise from the implementation of the fee just one year after
the formulation of the original proposal. The Administration increased it
again (from 30 to 61 billion) in the 2013 fiscal budget, just before the rebudget/fy2016/assets/budget.pdf. In the 2016 budget there was also a reference to the use of
revenue arising from the tax to pay for President Obama’s mortgage refinancing program,
which had been included in the 2013 fiscal budget (FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT at 26).
70.
FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSIBILITY FEE, supra note 60, at 1; see also FISCAL YEAR
2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S., supra note 69, at 55.
71.
Id. at 2 (stating that such institutions include “firms that were insured depository
institutions, bank holding companies, thrift holding companies, insurance or other companies
that owned insured depository institutions, or securities broker dealers as of January 14, 2010,
or that become one of these types of firms after January 2010.”).
72.
American Bankers Association CEO Frank Keating released a statement saying,
“[T]he banking industry strongly opposes the $61 billion bank tax included in President
Obama’s budget proposal. Despite claims to the contrary, the facts on TARP are very clear.
Taxpayers have profited $13 billion from their investments in banks through the program and
Treasury predicts they will see a lifetime positive return of more than $20 billion” without the
proposed tax. “Given that non-bank programs are responsible for all of TARP’s losses, this
would simply be an arbitrary tax with no regard to where losses actually occurred.” Frank
Keating, ABA Statement on Proposed Bank Tax, BANKERS AND THE ECONOMY (Feb. 13,
2012), http://banksandtheeconomy.blogspot.com/2012/02/aba-statement-on-proposed-banktax.html; see also Jia Lynn Yang & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama Budget Would Double
Bank Tax Size, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezraklein/post/obama-budget-would-double-bank-tax-size/2012/02/13/gIQA0bnJBR_blog.html.
For more recent data on TARP’s profitability, see generally U.S. TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: MONTHLY REPORT TO CONGRESS (June 2013), http://www.treasury
.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/May%202013%20Monthly%20Report
%20to%20Congress%20Final.pdf; see also Edward D. Kleinbard, WE ARE BETTER THAN
THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY 415-16 n.2 (2014).
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election campaign, and doubled in the 2016 budget, another pre-election
budget.73
The levy on risk-weighted assets or on liabilities would be imposed on
different elements of the balance sheet, but they are both essentially
aimed at reaching the same result: providing incentives to financial institutions to avoid engaging in excessively risky activities (the acquisition of an
excessive amount of high-risk assets and/or high leveraging). These levies
aim to reduce potential negative externalities and systemic risk by imposing an additional cost on the acquisition of riskier assets or the generation
of excessively high debt-to-equity ratios. In practice, these types of regulatory taxes rely on existing financial accounting systems and complement
other regulatory tools, such as capital requirements.
Moreover, these taxes can raise a significant amount of revenue and
introduce a typical insurance mechanism. This insurance effect is due to
the fact that the higher the risk of default (commensurate with the amount
of risky assets or the debt-to-equity ratio), the higher the insurance premium (in effect, the tax burden). These taxes may therefore function as an
insurance policy, creating a fund in case of future crisis. Once the insurance fund grows, the taxes can also be maintained in the long term. They
will preserve their beneficial corrective impact on the behavior of financial
firms because of the correlation between tax liability of the institutions
and their contribution to systemic risk.74
The levy on risk-weighted assets or on liabilities should also be evaluated on the basis of their potential for multilateral cooperation. For example, adopting a tax on risk-weighted assets would reduce the costs of
compliance from cross-border institutions because of the Basel capital requirements. These regulatory taxes can be applied unilaterally by individual countries but have global effects with the support of proper antiavoidance rules. Any relocation effects would be less likely to occur in
risky asset-based and liability-based taxes than in financial transaction
taxes (see infra Part IV) because financial institutions, in particular banks,
are tied to the financial centers where they have been located for many
years.75 Unilateral action by individual countries should then lead to multilateral cooperation at international levels through comprehensive and
coordinated interaction of most of the countries, in order to prevent excessive and unintended burdens on financial firms.
B.

Excess-profits Financial Taxes

The second type of entity-based financial regulatory tax is “excessprofits tax,” which is levied on profits realized by economic actors above a
standard level, commonly referred to as “economic rent,” “unearned in73.
See FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, see supra note 69, at
165; and FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S., supra note 69, at 55.
74.
See IMF, supra note 14, at 15. Notably, the liability-based levy proposed in the
United States does not establish an insurance/fund that may be used for a bailout in case of a
future crisis. FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSIBILITY FEE, supra note 60.
75.
See Page, supra note 18, at 207.
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come,” or “supernormal profit.”76 Excess-profits taxes have been imposed
in addition to existing corporate income tax, in most cases during national
emergencies like wars or economic turmoil. The U.S. Government relied
on these taxes to increase revenue during periods of distress and to prevent corporations from unduly benefitting from atypical consumer
purchasing or increased government spending during those periods.77
An excess-profits tax on financial firms is, in some ways, a policy option that can be used also for purposes other than those indicated above.
In the past, excess-profits taxes have been used by the U.S. government to
target specific industries, such as oil companies,78 but they and now can be
applied to the financial industry as well.79 Such a tax could be levied on
the profits of financial companies that are above a normal rate of return
for the industry, defined as the compounded amount of interest accrued
on debt and a notional return of equity.80
The main issue in designing an excess-profits tax for the financial sector is the definition of the notional rate of return of equity. This implies a
quite complex comparability analysis similar to that deployed in transfer
pricing and aimed at finding financial institutions with identical or nearly
identical features in terms of size, fees charged, and the type, amount, and
frequency of transactions. This in turn requires significant administrative
effort and a high compliance burden, which may affect the feasibility of
the tax.
The excess-profits tax, however, is not fully regulatory. In particular, it
is not capable of discouraging excessive risk-taking conduct, because the
causal linkage between excessive risk-taking and excess-profits is variable.
76.
See T.S. Adams, Federal Taxes Upon Income and Excess Profits, 8 AM. ECON.
REV. 18, 18 (1918); Carl C. Plehn, War Profits and Excess Profits Taxes, 10 AM. ECON. REV.
283, 284 (1920); Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi, INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 15 (Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi eds., 2012).
77.
The first implementation of an excess-profits tax in the United States was between
1917 and 1921 during the First World War. It was revived by federal legislation during World
War II and during the Korean War. The tax was levied on the excess of a corporation’s
peacetime earnings at a rate set by the government. See F.W. Taussig, The War Act of 1917,
32 Q. J. ECON., 1, 27-37; Adams, supra note 76, at 18; Plehn, supra note 76, at 288; William B.
Paul, Excess Profits Tax, 27 ACCT. REV. 44, 44-49 (1952).
78.
For instance, during the 1980s the price of a barrel of crude oil went above a certain specified threshold due to the exercise of oligopolistic pricing power by the members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and gave rise to a sharp increase in
domestic oil production income. The US was convinced that oil producers were obtaining
excess profits as a result of the situation and therefore enacted, for a period of time, an
excess-profits tax, which is commonly referred to as ‘windfall profits tax.’ See, e.g., Crude Oil
Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of Internal Revenue Code of 1954).); see also Dennis B. Drapkin & Philip
K. Verleger, Jr., The Windfall Profit Tax: Origins, Development Implications, 22 B.C.L. REV.
631, 659-67 (1981).
79.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the government imposed an excess-profits
tax on banks in the 1981 Budget to counteract the sharp increase in interest rates caused by
new monetary policies.
80.
Michael Devereux, New Bank Taxes, New World Order?, TAX ADVISER, June
2010, at 12, 13.
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Indeed, such a tax would be relatively neutral because companies generally aim to maximize profits regardless of tax rates, assuming that they are
not in a position to arbitrage tax rates.81 A financial excess-profits tax is a
regulatory tax to the extent that it can create an insurance-like fund available for future crisis management and can extract substantial revenue from
the financial sector.82 These are two goals that, as illustrated in Part II, are
both essential to the architecture of financial regulatory taxes. In practice,
the excess-profits tax on financial institutions is a traditional income tax
that, rather than incentivizing or discouraging specific risk-taking conduct
within the financial industry, can serve as a revenue-raising tool to fund
targeted regulatory programs83 and achieve redistributive goals.
Such a tax, like the risky asset-based or liability-based regulatory tax,
can initially be applied unilaterally by individual countries on a worldwide
basis along the lines of extraterritorial application of corporate taxes. This
would mean that relocation effects would be those currently regulated
under the residence rules of tax treaties and would certainly be lower than
those engendered by a financial transaction tax (see Part IV).
The IMF Report also proposed a levy based on excess profits. Indeed,
the IMF Report contains a proposal for the adoption of a Financial Activities Tax (FAT).84 The FAT, in its basic version, is a tax levied on the profits
of financial firms. The IMF proposed three different variants of the FAT—
hereinafter FAT1, FAT2 and FAT3—each of which is based on different
definition of the tax base.
FAT1 is characterized by a base that includes all wages and profits and
is designed in such a way that it would substantially function as a standard
consumption-type value added tax (VAT), which is a tax on sales of goods
and services less purchases of non-labor inputs. So FAT1, like a VAT,
would operate as a tax on the sum of wages and profits of financial firms85
and therefore would obviate the problem created by the exemption of
most financial services from VAT.
The main reason for the exemption from the VAT of most financial
services is that calculating the value added by a financial firm to a financial
product is extremely complicated due to the fact that, in most cases, the
charges for financial services are not explicitly stated as fees or commissions. Rather they are implicitly included in interest rate spreads and other
margins.86 The problem is that “the overall effect of the VAT exemp81.

Devereux, Fuest & Maffini, supra note 35, at 3.

82.
It has been estimated that an excess-profit tax on financial firms levied would be
capable of generating a significant amount of revenue. See id. at 5.
83.
See, e.g., Edmund Conway, IMF Targets Banks with ‘Excess Profits Tax’, The Telegraph (Apr. 5 2010, 10:24 PM) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfin
ance/7557409/IMF-targets-banks-with-excess-profits-tax.html.
84.

IMF, supra note 14, at 66-71.

85.

Id. at 66.

86.
See Alan J. Auerbach & Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Financial Services Under a
VAT, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 411, 412 (2002); Huizinga, supra note 40, at 500; Grubert &
Mackie, supra note 40, at 25; Poddar & English, supra note 40, at 92.
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tion . . . is ambiguous [as] the exemption reduces the tax burden on services to consumers but it also increases the tax burden on transactions with
businesses.”87 The VAT exemption on financial services was one of the
factors that, when compounded with the other tax privileges, resulted in
the financial institutions becoming unduly large, distorting competition in
several ways. In the view of the IMF, the implementation of FAT1 could
“partially offset the risk of the financial sector becoming unduly large because of its favorable treatment under existing VATs.”88 As for the VAT,
however, and also for FAT1, the risk is that the burden of the tax falls on
customers and increases the cost of employment.89
As opposed to FAT1, the tax base of FAT2 proposed by the IMF includes “supernormal” wages and profits, and the tax base of FAT3 includes only “very high” wages and profits.90 Therefore, FAT2 and FAT3
are a combination of an excess-profits tax and a tax on wages. The FAT is
capable, in all three of its variants, of generating a large amount of revenue. Yet each may “differ across countries, depending on the relative size,
profitability and wage structures of their financial sectors, and may be constrained by the need to apply low rates where the impact on competitiveness or the risk of avoidance are of concern.”91
As demonstrated by FAT2 and FAT3, which include wages in their
taxable base, the model of the excess-profits tax for financial institutions
may also encompass taxation on excess compensation for employees and
managers of financial companies. Before the crisis, the structure of compensation of most financial institutions strongly incentivized employees to
engage in excessively high-risk investments and activities. The compensation for employees was often structured to incentivize positive short-term
performance (essentially investments with a high-margin of volatile profitability),92 without providing disincentives with respect to conduct likely to
generate negative medium-to-long term effects.93
87.
Vella et al., supra note 35, at 613; see also Peter R. Merrill, VAT Treatment of the
Financial Sector, TAX ANALYST 163, 167-168 (2011).
88.

IMF, supra note 14, at 22.

89.
Michael Devereux, Clement Fuest, & Giorgia Maffini, Taxing Banks: The IMF
Proposals. A Briefing Note, 1 OXFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR BUS. TAXATION (Apr. 21, 2010),
eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/3538/1/taxing_banks_the_imf_proposals.pdf. Apr. For a detailed comparison between VAT and FAT1, see Shaviro, supra note 38, at 13-17.
90.

IMF, supra note 14, at 67-68.

91.

Id. at 68.

92.

See, e.g., Ben Chu, Bank Bonuses: No Rhyme, Reason or Justification, THE INDE(Jan. 25, 2011, 2:04 PM), http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2011/01/25/bank-bonusesno-rhyme-reason-or-justification/.
PENDENT

93.
Bonuses have usually been provided in the form of stock options and other stockbased compensation, which are usually deferred and subject to more favorable tax treatment
than cash compensation. See Alworth & Arachi, supra note 76, at 9. For a detailed analysis of
tax treatment of the financial sector’s remuneration plans in OECD countries, see Vieri Ceriani, Stefano Manestra, Giacomo Ricotti &, and Alessandra Sanelli, The Role of Taxes in
Compensation Schemes and Structured Finance, in TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 88
(Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi eds., 2012).
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In fact, during the crisis, public opinion strongly supported the imposition of a high tax rate on those individuals who gained an enormous
amount of money in the form of bonuses for making decisions that largely
contributed to the creation of the financial crisis. Temporary taxes on bonuses were thus introduced. For example, the UK Bank Payroll Tax, which
took effect on December 9, 2009 and expired on April 5, 2010, was imposed on all bonuses exceeding 25,000 pounds sterling at a fifty perfect
rate.94 The French bonus tax was also levied at a fifty percent rate.95 It had
a similar threshold to the UK Bank Payroll Tax and was levied on bonuses
paid during the 2009 accounting year.96
These taxes were designed as retrospective and temporary because
they were considered penalties for the past conduct of bank employees.
However, it seems that such a penalty goal was not reached. There is, in
fact, evidence that these taxes were actually paid by the employers via a
grossing up of pre-tax compensation,97 with the consequence that the cost
of the taxes was borne by the financial institutions’ shareholders rather
than by the employees who received the bonuses.98 The likely reason for
this tax shifting is found in the decision by shareholders to bear the burden
of the tax in order to prevent top managers from moving to other companies with headquarters located in countries where such a tax was not
adopted. The decision to pay the tax out of the institutions’ profits may
have also been influenced by the shareholders’ awareness of the temporary nature of the tax. Such tax shifting raises two main issues. First, there
are indirect consequences of such a tax on bank capitalization. The fact
that financial institutions are induced—at least in the short term—to pay
the tax on employees’ bonuses out of their profits (via a grossing-up of the
managers’ compensation) may make it more difficult to comply with the
regulatory capital requirements. The second issue is whether the penalty
goal pursued through a tax on bonuses may be more efficiently reached by
means of a direct tax on bank profits, like an excess-profits tax. A tax on
bonuses, if expected to reoccur, practically amounts to an “invitation to
avoidance, given the difficulty of ascertaining and monitoring what part of
compensation is in fact a ‘bonus.’”99 In light of these considerations and
the fact that the revenue raised is not significant in macroeconomic terms,
this type of tax has been substantially abandoned.100
94.

IMF, supra note 14, at 8.

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Alworth & Arachi, supra note 76, at 12-14.

98.
Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel Shaviro & Joel Slemrod, Taxation and the Financial Sector, 18, New York University School of Law: Public Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-30, (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1601330.
99.

Id.

100.
As has been pointed out, “[i]f the bonus tax has the objective to raise revenue
from bank employees in leading positions, a levy on all types of remuneration (including the
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THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX
A.

General Features

The third type of financial regulatory tax is generally identified as a
“financial transaction tax” or “tax on financial transactions” (FTT). As the
name suggests, an FTT is a levy on specifically-targeted transactions that
involve the trading of financial instruments. More precisely, an FTT applies “to purchases and sales of financial instruments as well as other types
of financial transactions that may not technically constitute a purchase or
sale (e.g., various types of derivatives) but have a similar effect. As such,
FTTs can be levied on one, a few, or a broad range of instruments, including stocks, fixed income securities, derivatives, and foreign exchange.”101
The first authoritative proponent of the implementation of an FTT
was John Maynard Keynes. In his view, short-term speculation over enterprises by means of financial instruments trading, like speculation carried
out in Wall Street during the 1930s, could affect the price of the underlying
assets and push them away from their fundamental equilibrium values,
with negative impacts on the real economy and employment. To deal with
this, Keynes proposed “[t]he introduction of a substantial Government
transfer tax on all transactions [which] might prove [to be] the most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the predominance of
speculation over enterprise.”102 According to that proposal, the tax should
have been imposed on transactions in the stock market, instead of every
financial transaction in every market.
More than forty years later, James Tobin revived the idea of an FTT
after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system for stabilizing currencies in the early 1970s. In that context, Tobin advanced a proposal for a
global uniform tax at a very low rate on all currency exchanges. According
to Tobin, this tax would have been particularly effective at deterring what
he called “short-term financial round-trip excursions into another currency” and therefore would reduce currency market volatility.103
Beginning in the 1980s, the liberalization of financial markets compounded with financial innovation—in particular derivatives instruments—provoked a boom in trading activity (that is, ‘liquidity’)
characterized by the predominance of short-term speculation. This speculation in turn gave rise to volatility, with wide fluctuations of asset not just
in the short-term but also in the long-term.104 However, there was no immediate national policy response.
fixed wage) beyond a certain wage level would seem more appropriate in the financial sector.” Devereux, Fuest & Maffini, supra note 35, at 5.
101.
Brondolo, supra note 16, at 3.
102.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY, 160 (1st ed., 1936).
103.
James Tobin, Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153, 155
(1978).
104.
On the concept of “volatility” in general, see ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY (1989).
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Several countries already had taxes in place regarding transactions of
securities devoid of specific regulatory intent, but these taxes were mostly
repealed,105 with the notable exception of the UK, which has maintained
an FTT over the last 25 years (see infra).106 National governments were
hesitant to implement FTTs, because the liberalization and globalization
of markets that occurred in the last two decades of the last century was
based on the high mobility of capital and financial transactions among different markets, and an FTT was generally perceived to be an obstacle to a
successful market. A renewed interest by policy-makers in the debate over
FTTs was spurred by the last crisis. The European Commission proposed
the adoption of a tax that would apply to all transactions in which a European-based institution is involved. A specific analysis of this proposal will
be provided infra in Section IV.C; here, the general rationale of the FTT
model will be discussed.
The goal of an FTT is to reduce short-term liquidity and market volatility by imposing an additional transaction cost on targeted trades without
impacting medium and long-term liquidity, thereby stabilizing asset prices.
This works in practice because the more frequently transactions occur, the
higher the cumulated effect of such a tax. Ultimately, the tax should reduce the volatility of both short-term and long-term asset prices and positively affect overall macroeconomic performance.107 As a result, the FTT
exhibits a complex regulatory structure and differs from the traditional
taxes on transactions of securities.
The model of the FTT as a volatility reducer is indeed premised on the
assumption that modern financial markets—more or less like the 1930s
markets Keynes referred to in his original proposal—are characterized by
excessive trading activity (excessive liquidity) due to the high volume of
short-term speculation, which gives rise to “long swings in asset prices and,
hence, persistent deviation from their fundamental equilibrium” (excessive long-term volatility).108
The causal correlations between the internalization of the additional
cost imposed by the FTT and its purported effects are obviously difficult
to estimate.109 But the principal criticism raised by opponents of such a tax
105.
In particular, financial transaction taxes were eliminated in the United States
(turnover tax at federal level, 1966), Spain (1988), the Netherlands (transfer tax 1990, capital
duty 2006), Germany (security tax, 1965), Sweden (transfer tax 1991), Denmark (capital duty
1993, transfer tax 1999), Japan (1999), Austria (securities tax 1995, stock exchange turnover
tax 2000), Italy (capital duty 2000), Ireland (2005) and Belgium (2006). Stephan Schulmeister, Margit Schratzenstaller & Oliver Picek, A General Financial Transaction Tax Motives,
Revenues, Feasibility and Effects, 14-15 AUSTRIAN INST. OF ECON. RESEARCH (Mar. 2008),
http:ssrn.com/abstract=1714395.
106.

Id. at 24-26.

107.

Id. at 7.

108.

Id. at 1-2, 7.

109.
This was highlighted by Alworth & Arachi, supra note 76, at 20 (“The various
empirical studies fail to detect a strong relationship between an increase in transaction costs
(via either taxes or other means) and the functioning of markets. Most studies find that trade
volume is reduced, but the effects on volatility and prices are less clear, even though results
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is that reducing short-term liquidity is not, by itself, a good aim. According
to this view, based on the efficient capital market hypothesis,110 high trading volumes are crucial for price discovery and for driving asset prices toward their fundamental equilibrium.111 In addition, much of short-term
trading is related to hedging thus, constituting a form of risk
management.112
There is also a more moderate critical view regarding the adoption of
an FTT, which provides that such a tax “may also suppress activity by
informed traders and arbitrageurs, whose trading tends to push prices towards their fundamental values.”113 The fundamental problem highlighted
by this middle-of-the-road view is that it is often difficult to discriminate
between good and bad trading.114 Defining the scope and the rate at which
to apply an FTT in a way that reduces volatility without discouraging good
trading activity is thus an extremely complicated and sophisticated task.
Proponents of the FTT argue that such a tax has already proven to be
effective when properly designed. They cite the U.K. experience (see infra
Section IV.B) as an example of successful implementation.115 They also
emphasize that “there is a remarkable discrepancy between the levels of
financial transactions and the levels of the ‘underlying’ transactions in the
‘real world’ . . . [which] suggest[s] that financial markets are [currently]
characterized by excessive liquidity and by excessive long-run volatility of
prices.”116 In particular, they point out that “the volume of financial transactions in the global economy is 73.5 times higher than nominal world
GDP.”117 If that is the case, it is not conceivable that the spectacular rise
in trading is caused only by hedging or genuine price discovery.
Thus, the FTT is a regulatory tax that addresses market volatility and
that does not target a financial firm’s ability to pay in terms of its income
based on panel data and estimation approaches that better identify transaction cost effects
seem to find unexpectedly a positive relationship between transaction costs and volatility.”);
see also Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and Evidence 20 (IMF
Working Paper No. 11/54, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1154.pdf
(discussing ambiguity in relation to short-term price volatility); see also Devereux, Fuest &
Maffini, supra note 35, at 5.
110.
See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. OF FIN. 383 (1970).
111.

Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller & Picek, supra note 105, at 7.

112.
Opinion of the European Central Bank of 4 November 2004 at the request of the
Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law introducing a tax on exchange operations involving
foreign exchange, banknotes and currency, CON/2004/34, 3 (2004).); see also Karl
Habermeier & Andrei A. Kirilenko, Securities Transaction Taxes and Financial Markets, 50
IMF STAFF PAPERS 165, 178 (2003).
113.

Matheson, supra note 109, at 20.

114.

See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 26.

115.

Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller & Picek, supra note 105, at 24-26.

116.

Id. at 43-44.

117.
Stephan Schulmeister, A General Financial Transaction Tax: A Short Cut of the
Pros, the Cons and a Proposal, 5 (WIFO, Working Paper No. 344, 2009), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1714336.
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or wealth. In fact, FTT rates are determined according to market factors
rather than by the need to collect revenues, and policy-makers should constantly ensure that rates are adjusted (relatively low) to prevent unintended distortions, essentially the risk of substitution/relocation (see infra
Section IV.B).118
In addition, the FTT rate should be low, because a high FTT rate may
provoke an increase in the cost of capital. This is due to the fact that, since
a company’s cost of capital is determined by the minimum rate of return
demanded by investors, the imposition of an additional transaction cost
arising from the transaction tax could be accompanied by demand from
investors for a higher minimum rate of return on their investment. This
would increase companies’ cost of capital, which would have detrimental
effects on the real economy and on economic growth.119
B.

The ‘Relocation’ and ‘Substitution’ Risks

As noted in Part II.B, the need for an aggregate effort by countries to
implement regulatory taxes at a global level creates the opportunity for
free riding by non-cooperating countries. This risk is particularly acute
with the FTT because the existence of only a few non-taxing countries can
give rise to a relocation risk, referring to the risk that entities shift their
residence or the transaction to countries where the FTT is not in place,
frustrating the FTT’s goal of reducing volatility.
Therefore, the risk of relocation is caused by the existence of competing jurisdictions that do not impose an FTT, thereby attracting relevant
trades out of the tax jurisdiction of countries that do enforce an FTT. With
respect to this free-riding problem, one should distinguish the situation of
an FTT that is unilaterally imposed by one country and the situation of an
FTT that is multilaterally imposed by various countries.
Two approaches are available when a country imposes the FTT unilaterally: the territorial approach and the worldwide approach. In the territorial approach, the relevant country taxes only transactions that are carried
118.
See Matheson, supra note 109, at 36-37; Commission Staff Working Paper, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Directive
on a Common System of Financial Transaction Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC, at 9,
SEC (2011) 1103 final (Sept. 28, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/docu
ments/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/summ_impact_assesmt_en.pdf (“A low flat statutory tax rate is assumed to be essential to avoid strong negative impacts on markets and to
ensure some revenue collection, since the incentives for avoidance increase with the tax rate.
The IA also suggests differentiated rate by category of products as a good way to mitigate the
relocation risks while ensuring appropriate revenues. [In conclusion, f]or an efficient application of any version of an FTT in the EU, a common definition of the scope of the tax, tax
rates as well as on the precise tax bases and other essential features of the tax is highly
advisable.”).
119.
See Benjamin Cortez & Thorsten Vogel, A Financial Transaction Tax for Europe,
20 EC TAX REV. 16, 21 (2011) (explaining that, nevertheless, “the increase [in the cost of
capital] could be mitigated by the reduced volume of government bonds due to the tax revenue generated by the FTT, which, in turn, would increase the demand for non-government
securities.”).

Summer 2015]

Global Architecture of Financial Regulatory Taxes

633

out through traders and intermediaries established in that country.120 For
example, an FTT was introduced in Sweden in 1984 with rates ranging
between 0.5% and 2%.121 It was levied on all transactions of securities
registered in Sweden and all transactions in which a Swedish intermediary
was involved.122 Under the territorial approach, the FTT is significantly
prone to relocation effects. The case of Sweden is a good example: the
parties to a transaction of shares of Swedish companies were not subject to
tax if the transaction was not carried out through a Swedish intermediary.
As a result, a large part of securities trading for Swedish companies was
relocated abroad outside the reach of the tax, with detrimental effects not
just in terms of revenue collected but also in terms of macroeconomic performance. In light of this relocation, the Swedish government repealed the
FTT in 1991.123
Under the worldwide approach, a country unilaterally imposes an
FTT on all of the transactions for securities issued in the country, regardless of the location of the transaction or place of establishment of the parties and the intermediaries. For example, in 1964, the U.K. enacted a type
of FTT (the British Stamp Duty Reserve Tax) on the transfer of ownership
of shares of companies established in the U.K., regardless of the location
of the transaction and the establishment of the trader.124
The worldwide FTT tends not to cause relocation effects, because
transactions remain subject to the tax even if they are shifted abroad. In
addition, in the U.K., prevention of the risk of relocation is effected by a
special “exit charge” of 1.5% applied when shares are transferred to clearance services or converted into financial products that are excluded from
the scope of the tax.125 A drawback to the unilateral application of a
worldwide FTT is potential enforcement and collection problems with regard to taxable transactions carried out abroad.
In contrast to FTTs that may be applied unilaterally by individual
countries, different countries can apply FTTs through multilateral cooper120.
When transactions are carried out through resident intermediaries, there are two
variants of FTT based on the territorial approach: in one, the FTT taxes transactions on
securities issued by both resident and non-resident companies; in the other, the FTT only
taxes transactions on securities issued by resident companies.
121.
John Y. Campbell & Kenneth A. Froot, International Experiences with Securities
Transaction Taxes, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EQUITY MARKETS 277, 280 (1994).
122.

Id.

123.

Id. at 281.

124.
Application of the tax to transactions outside of the UK’s territory began in 1996.
Shares of foreign companies issued or listed on the London Stock Exchange are not subject
to the tax. PATRICK CANNON, TOLLEY’S STAMP DUTIES AND STAMP RESERVE TAX 61.7 (9th
ed., 2001). The Act is still in force in the U.K., although it has been largely modified. Currently, there is a 0.5% tax on the registration of ownership of shares, consisting of a stamp
(now an electronic stamp) that is required to make the purchase of shares legally effective.
125.
In the worldwide approach to FTT, however, the risks of relocation can be a problem insofar as companies established in the residence-country effectively migrate to nontaxing countries.
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ation. There are essentially two scenarios: global and regional
multilateralism.
Global multilateralism would be achieved if all (or virtually all) countries agreed on a global FTT and established apportionment rules, exchange of information rules, and dispute settlement procedures. Under
global multilateralism, the risk of relocation would be entirely prevented.
Global multilateralism, however, is a goal that cannot be achieved in the
short term because it implies a virtually complete unanimous consent by
numerous countries.
In the short and medium term, a more reasonable strategy is to pursue
regional multilateralism. That is, complete multilateralism at regional
levels—for example, in the EU (see infra Section IV.C). In such a case,
however, enforcement of the tax would still be prone to a particular form
of relocation risk, as opportunistic taxpayers would be able to transfer
their transactions or establishments to countries that are not parties to the
regional agreement.
In addition, the FTT is exposed to the risk of substitution. In other
words, taxable transactions can be replaced by non-taxable transactions.
Indeed, such a tax can apply to transactions of all kinds or only to certain
specific transactions (such as transactions involving shares, corporate
bonds, derivatives, or currencies). Most experts suggest the broadest possible scope, since a tax that is imposed only on specific markets may indeed
create unintended distortionary effects. It may, for one thing, induce a
shift of investments from one type of instruments to another solely for tax
reasons thus, producing economically inefficient outcomes. For example, if
assets that are not subject to the FTT are characterized by the same level
of profitability as the transactions subject to the tax, investors and institutions are likely to switch their investment to the former if the net cost of
switching is lower than the tax imposed on the latter, especially when all
types of financial instruments can serve as substitutes for one another.126
C.

The EU Commission’s Proposal for an FTT

On September 28, 2011, the European Commission released a proposal for an FTT based on the model of regional multilateralism (hereinafter,
the “EU Proposal” or “EU FTT”).127 Originally, all of the Member States
of the European Union planned on unanimously approving the EU Proposal. However, due to the lack of unanimous consensus (with the United
Kingdom leading the group of Member States opposing the enactment of
126.
Vella et al., supra note 35, at 609; Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller & Picek, supra
note 105, at 20.
127.
See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial Transaction Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC, COM (2011) 594 final (Sept. 28,
2011), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/finan
cial_sector/com%282011%29594_en.pdf.
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the measure),128 the EU Proposal, in a slightly updated version,129 is currently the subject of an “enhanced cooperation” procedure130 promoted
by ten Member States.131
128.
See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Econ. and Fin. Affairs (June
22, 2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/131141
.pdf. For United Kingdom opposition to the Proposal, see Transcript of David Cameron interview, THE ANDREW MARR SHOW, BBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
programmes/andrew_marr_show/9673749.stm (stating that, in response to the interviewer’s
question “You will block it [the EU Proposal for a common FTT]?”, Prime Minister Cameron stated: “Unless the rest of the world all agreed at the same time that we’re all going to
have some sort of tax, then we’re not going to go ahead with that.”).
129.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, COM (2013) 71 final (Feb. 14, 2013), http://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/com_2013_71_en.pdf.
130.
Enhanced cooperation was initially introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999)
and the Treaty of Nice (2003), which made the Europe legislative procedures less restrictive.
Under these treaties, the right to veto that had been previously enjoyed by Member States
was eliminated (except in the field of foreign policy), the number of Member States required
for launching the procedure changed from the majority to nine Member States, and the procedure’s scope was extended to common foreign and security policies. The general provisions
applicable to enhanced cooperation have been grouped together in Title VII of the Treaty on
European Union. For more information regarding enhanced cooperation, see Csaba Törö,
The Latest Example of Enhanced Cooperation in the Constitutional Treaty: The Benefits of
Flexibility and Differentiation in European Security and Defence Policy Decisions and Their
Implementation, 11 EUROPEAN L.J. 641 (2005); Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Enhanced Cooperation: The Ultimate Challenge of Managing Diversity in Europe: New Perspectives on the European Integration Process, 40 INTERECONOMICS : REV. OF EUROPEAN ECON.
POL’Y 201 (2005); Frédéric Allemand, The Impact of the EU Enlargement on Economic and
Monetary Union: What Lessons Can Be Learnt From the Differentiated Integration Mechanisms in an Enlarged Europe?, 11 EUROPEAN L. J. 586 (2005); Vlad Costantinesco, Les
clauses de “coopération renforcée” - Le protocole sur l’application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité [“Enhanced Cooperation” Clauses – The Protocol on Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality], 33 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU
DROIT EUROPÉEN 751 (1997).
131.
The Council authorized the requesting Member States to engage in the enhanced
cooperation procedure on January 22, 2013. See Press Release, Council of the European
Union, Financial Transaction Tax: Council Agrees to Enhance Cooperation (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/234949.pdf. Initially, eleven Member States requested to engage in the enhanced cooperation procedure:
Austria, Belgium, France, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, and
Spain. On May 6, 2014, Slovenia expressed reluctance on signing a declaration through which
the requesting Member States committed themselves to finalize the procedure. See Slovenia
Wants Broader Tax Base for Financial Transaction Tax, GOV’T COMMC’N OFFICE FOR REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA, May 19, 2014, http://www.sloveniatimes.com/slovenia-wants-broadertax-base-for-financial-transactions-tax. Therefore, there are currently only ten Member
States proactively engaged in the enhanced cooperation procedure. The UK challenged the
legality of the Council’s decision of January 22, 2013 authorizing enhanced cooperation for
the adoption of an FTT. On April 30, 2014, the European Court of Justice rejected the UK’s
arguments and dismissed the case. See Case C-209/13, U.K. v. Council (Apr. 30, 2014), http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0209&from=EN. However, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, stated that the UK would advance a new challenge if the final design of the proposed FTT had implications for the UK.
See Angela Monaghan, George Osborne bristles as EU moves closer to financial transaction
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In the EU Proposal, the EU Commission expressly identifies “addressing particularly risky behavior” as one of the main targets of a coordinated EU FTT.132 The proposed tax is based on the finding that the
exponential rise over the last two decades of trading constitutes strong
evidence that EU financial markets are characterized by excessive liquidity.133 The EU FTT would therefore be an evolution of the current model
of existing national taxes on securities transactions. It would purportedly
regulate the volume of trade by imposing an additional cost on transactions. Other objectives of the EU Proposal include raising revenue to provide adequate contributions from the financial sector to public finances
and coordinating national laws concerning indirect taxation of financial
transactions.134
The financial industry has advanced an argument loosely based on the
efficient market hypothesis that increased trading, and in particular derivatives trading, is caused by normal hedging, and that it should not be regulated because it allows genuine price discovery.135 However, others argue
that, even accounting for the effect of an EU FTT, the volume of trading
would remain thirty-five times higher than the GDP, thereby enabling an
efficient price discovery process and providing “enough liquidity for hedging purposes.”136
The proposed EU FTT would cover a broad range of financial transactions. In particular, the scope of the tax would include transactions involving financial instruments that are negotiable on the capital markets
tax, THE GUARDIAN (May 6, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/
06/george-osborne-eu-financial-transaction-tax-legal-challenge.
132.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial
Transaction Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC, supra note 127, at 2; Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial
Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 4.
133.
Schulmeister, supra note 117, at 5, 7 (“The volume of financial transactions in the
global economy is 73.5 times higher than the nominal world GDP. In 1990 this ratio
amounted to ‘only’ 15.3.”). See also Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller & Picek, supra note 105, at
43-44 (“[T]he volume of foreign exchange transactions is almost 70 times higher than world
trade of goods and services. In Germany, the UK and the US, the volume of stock trading is
almost 100 times bigger than business investment, and the trading volume of interest rate
securities is even several 100 times greater than overall investment.”).
134.
The Commission stated that the goal of the EU Proposal is “to avoid fragmentation in the internal market for financial services, bearing in mind the increasing number of
uncoordinated national tax measures being put in place” during the crisis. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial Transaction Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC, supra note 127, at 2. The same goal has been confirmed in the
February 2013 Proposal. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 2, 32.
135.
Noam Noked, EU Proposed Financial Transaction Tax – Fortune or Folly?, THE
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 17, 2011), http://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2011/11/17/eu-proposed/transaction-tax-fortune-or-folly/.
136.
STEPHAN SCHULMEISTER, AUST. INST. OF ECON. RESEARCH, Bank Levy Versus
Transactions Tax: A Critical Analysis of the IMF and EC Reports on Financial Sector Taxation 4 (2010), http://stephan.schulmeister.wifo.ac.at/fileadmin/homepage_schulmeister/files/
FTT_StS_on_IMF_EC_04_10_.
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(including transferable securities and money market instruments except
the instruments of payment), units or shares in collective investment undertakings, and derivative agreements, as well as transactions outside the
organized markets, including over-the-counter (OTC) transactions.137
However, there are exemptions motivated by public interest concerns.
Transactions with the European Central Bank or national central banks of
EU Member States would not be subject to the tax so as not to affect
monetary policies or refinancing opportunities for financial institutions.
Transactions with international organizations would also be excluded from
the scope of the tax in consideration of the sovereign debt crisis.138 Transactions connected with business activities or carried out by investors in
their capacity as citizens are excluded as well. Examples of these transactions are insurance contracts, mortgage lending and consumer credit and
payment services. Currency transactions on spot markets are also exempted.139 In addition, the EU Proposal sets forth an exception for primary market transactions and for transactions arising from restructuring
operations.140
According to the EU Proposal, a tax would be levied at the rate of
0.1% on transactions involving shares of stock and bonds, and 0.01% on
all transactions involving derivatives transactions. In the Commission’s
forecast, it is expected to raise thirty to thirty-five billion euros per year.141
According to the EU Proposal, revenue arising from the tax will be apportioned among the various countries, depending “on the place of establishment of the financial institutions involved in financial transactions and not
on the place of trade.”142 This solution meets the demands of Member
137.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 8. Actually, for the meaning
of “financial instruments,” the Commission’s Proposal refers to the MiFID Directive, which,
in turn, provides an enumeration of financial instruments that can be subject to transactions
that qualify as “financial transactions.” For the MiFID Directive’s definition, see Council
Directive 2004/39/EC, Annex 1 Sec. C, 2004 O.J. (L. 145/41), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0039&from=EN.
138.
Laurent de La Mettrie, Patricia Songnaba & Donald Murre, The European Financial Transaction Tax: The New Reality, 15 DERIVATIVES & FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 71, 7273 (2013).
139.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 23-24. However, if these
instruments and services “are securitized and traded as structured products, these transactions are within the scope” of the tax. De La Mettrie, Songnaba & Murre, supra note 138, at
72.
140.
Art. 3(4)(a) and (g) of Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 17.
141.
Id. at 14, 26. Although the envisaged tax rates are the same as those indicated in
the original Proposal, in its new Proposal the Commission lowered the expected revenue per
year, which originally was fifty-seven million euros – this is clearly consequent to the narrower group of Member States which are engaged in the enhanced cooperation procedure.
See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the
Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 14.
142.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial
Transaction Tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, supra note 127, at 5 (see “Impact assess-
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States like France or Germany, which are the headquarters of large financial institutions, but is not likely to satisfy other countries, which host a
number of institutions disproportionate to the amount of transactions.143
Under the EU Proposal, an unspecified portion of the revenue could
be used for the EU budget, thereby reducing the required contributions of
Member States.144 This raises serious questions in terms of feasibility. In
particular, the unpredictability of revenue raised by the FTT—due to the
inherent relocation risk if the tax is not implemented by all of the Member
States—makes such a type of tax an unreliable source of funding.145
The EU Proposal adopts a territorial approach, under which a transaction is subject to taxation as long as at least one of the parties is a financial
institution established in a Member State participating in the enhanced
cooperation procedure (hereinafter, “Participating Member State”).146
Such a structure deals effectively with the risks of relocation among the
Participating Member States, but leaves the tax vulnerable to relocation to
other jurisdictions.147 For this reason, in the updated version of the EU
Proposal, the EU Commission clarified that the term “establishment” for
the purpose of the EU FTT is not defined by the place of incorporation,
but is identified by several substantial criteria set forth by the EU Proposal.148 Moreover, the European Commission added to the 2013 updated
ment”, to which the 2013 Proposal refers). See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive
Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note
129, at 6.
143.
This would have been the case for the UK, which rejected the Commission’s Proposal and is not one of the countries pursuing the enhanced cooperation procedure for the
enactment of the EU FTT. According to estimates, up to eighty percent of income that could
have been raised by the tax would have arisen from transactions based in London. See
Noked, supra note 135.
144.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 4.
145.

Vella et al., supra note 35, at 612-13, 616.

146.
According to Article 4 of the current Proposal, a financial institution is considered
‘established’ in the European Union when it is authorized, has its registered seat, its permanent address, its usual residence or a branch in one of the Member States. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial
Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 24.
147.
If the parties of the transaction are both established in territories of countries that
do not adopt the FTT, the transaction is not subject to the common tax. This type of avoidance can be pursued by large institutions, which can carry out transactions through subsidiaries established in jurisdictions not involved in the implementation of the FTT. See Vella et al.,
supra note 35, at 611; Carlo Garbarino & Giulio Allevato, Financial Transaction Tax
europea: obiettivi dichiarati e potenziali effetti distorsivi, 12 FISCALITÀ E COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 14, 17-19 (2012).
148.
Such criteria are, in particular, i) the authorization of the financial institution by
the regulator of a participating Member State; ii) the authorization provided by a participating Member State different from that where the transaction takes place; iii) the holding of a
registered seat in a participating Member State; iv) the holding of a permanent address in a
participating Member State; v) the disposal of a branch within a participating Member State;
vi) a residual criterion according to which if a financial institution takes part in a transaction
with another financial institution, or even with a non-financial institution, established in a
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version of its Proposal the “issuance principle,” an element borrowed from
the worldwide approach (see supra Section IV.B.) according to which financial instruments issued in the Participating Member States will be
taxed when traded, even if the firms trading such instruments are not established within the FTT zone.149 Finally, explicit anti-abuse provisions
are now included.150
Nevertheless, the lack of a global implementation of an FTT may still
give rise to relocation concerns and may result in competitive disadvantages for the markets of Participating Member States. Due to this concern,
the U.K., at the time of the first EU Commission’s proposal, stated that it
would oppose the adoption of the proposed tax if not implemented within
a globally coordinated framework, including all of the other main financial
regions outside of Europe.151 Indeed, the U.K. was one of the countries
that opposed the adoption of the EU Proposal in June 2012.152 As a result
of the decision by only eleven Member States to engage in enhanced cooperation procedure, the FTT-zone will be even smaller and, correspondingly, the relocation risk to the non FTT-zone will be increased.
Businesses, financial organizations, governments (mainly the U.K.)
and international institutions, such as the IMF, have raised criticism to the
EU Proposal. This criticism coalesces around four themes. First, some critics have argued that the tax may have a detrimental effect on the financial
sector and on overall GDP growth in terms of increase in the cost of capital.153 Second, others have claimed that the adoption of an EU FTT, without similar provisions in the other main financial centers around the world,
would represent a significant competitive disadvantage for the European
centers.154 Third, it is contended that the EU proposal is not sufficiently
consistent with the Commission’s goal of ensuring harmonized function of
the European Internal Market because the Commission should have tried

participating Member State according to one of the previous five criteria, such financial institution is deemed to be established in that Member State as well. Commission Proposal for a
Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction
Tax, supra note 129, at 24; see also de La Mettrie, Songnaba & Murre, supra note 138, at 75.
149.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 18.
150.
In particular, the new Proposal includes a provision which deals directly with depository receipts and similar securities, and a general anti-abuse rule aimed at tackling almost
any form of avoidance. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 28-29.
151.
European Union Comm., Rep. on Its Twenty-Ninth Session, Towards a Financial
Transaction Tax, at 55-56 (2010-12).
152.

See supra note 128.

153.
The European Commission originally estimated the impact of the FTT, in terms of
GDP losses, between 0.5 and 1.76%. See Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, supra
note 118, at 10.
154.

Noked, supra note 135.
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to coordinate these national levies introduced by some Member States,155
rather than imposing a top-down solution.156
Lastly, critics have also cast doubt on the administrative feasibility of
such a tax. With regard to the Participating Member States’ tax authorities, there is a concern about implementation and collection of the tax.
This is mainly due to the fact that the EU Proposal does not provide much
guidance on this topic and only provides that the tax should be paid at the
moment of the electronic transaction or within three working days of the
conclusion of a non-electronic transaction. Moreover, the burden of the
tax collection falls on the participating Member States on the basis of internal regulations to be enacted.157
It is also likely that taxpayers would encounter difficulty administering
the tax. Since the EU FTT would potentially apply to a large range of
transactions, including transactions outside the organized markets, this tax
would be difficult to administer, as it would require firms to track individual transactions rather than to report a final position at the end of the
financial year as occurs with backward-looking levies such as risky assetbased and liability-based taxes. However, these administrative problems
can be mitigated by several factors, including clearinghouses taking a more
prominent role in settling financial transactions, the growth of automated
trading platforms, the movement from paper securities to electronic book
entries, and the recent progression toward more stringent regulation of
OTC derivatives in a number of countries.158
VI.

HOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY TAXES COMPLEMENT
DIRECT REGULATION

Parts IV and V described the main types of financial regulatory taxes
and some of the concrete proposals recently advanced by governments
and international organizations. It is important to note that such regulatory taxes (risky-asset and liability-based taxes, excess-profits tax, and
FTT) are not exclusive of one another, but if properly designed and carefully implemented can be applied in combination.
155.
See Vella et al., supra note 35, at 620; Devereux, New Bank Taxes, New World
Order?, supra note 80, at 13. Only after the issuance of the Commission’s proposal, a few
Member States enacted domestic financial transaction taxes. These taxes have been enacted
by Italy, France, and Hungary but have been strongly criticized. The critiques focused on the
potential counter-productive effects of unilateral enforcement and on the fact that such taxes
differ from each other and even from the Commission’s proposal. See, e.g., Garbarino &
Allevato, supra note 147, at 17.
156.
As a matter of fact, the explicit efforts of the Commission have been to harmonize
top-down rather than to coordinate national legislation: “Several EU Member States have
already taken divergent action in the area of financial sector taxation. The purpose of this
proposal is to provide a common European approach to this issue that is consistent with the
internal market.” Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of
Financial Transaction Tax and Amending Directive 2008/7/EC, supra note 127, at 2.
157.
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, supra note 129, at 26-28.
158.
Brondolo, supra note 16, at 5.
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In such a flexible choice architecture, these taxes are potentially capable to reach, at domestic and international levels, varying degrees of the
three policy goals of (1) discouraging excessive risk-taking, (2) building an
insurance fund available for future crisis management, and (3) raising
more revenue from the industry which creates the negative externalities,
thereby achieving greater redistribution and fairness effects within the tax
system as a whole (see supra Section II.A). Consequently, these different
types of financial regulatory taxes can be combined as a cluster of diversified incentives.
There is an additional important feature of regulatory financial
taxes—the potential impact of such taxes on and their interconnection
with direct regulation. This interconnection constitutes, as mentioned in
Part III, the third layer of the choice architecture of financial regulatory
taxes.
In a broad sense, there are two aspects of this interconnection: first,
both approaches are aligned as to their goals; and second, both approaches
are functionally interdependent.
The goals of these two policy approaches are aligned, because they
both operate as preventive measures against negative externalities. Regulatory taxes, by attributing a certain cost ex ante, leave to the market
mechanism the reduction of potential negative externalities. Direct regulation, on the other hand, compels ex ante certain kinds of behavior that are
expected to reduce risks because they have a tendency to create negative
externalities.
In particular, regulatory taxes can address one or more of the central
externalities (for example, volatility through FTT or excessive risk through
a liabilities-based levy), while improved traditional regulation can cover
other externalities and behaviors or reinforce the impact of regulatory
taxes.
Furthermore, financial regulatory taxes and direct regulation are functionally interdependent for two reasons. First, there is a feedback loop
between these two policy approaches. Regulatory taxes should be able to
reduce negative externalities, and this, in turn, should facilitate the similar
task of direct regulation. At the same time, however, direct regulation
should be able to reduce negative externalities, and this, in turn, should
facilitate the similar task of regulatory taxes. Because of this expected
feedback loop, the more that negative externalities are reduced by regulatory taxes, the more direct regulation will more easily achieve its goals,
and vice versa.
Second, there is a symbiotic operation159 of these two approaches. On
the one hand, regulatory taxes extract earmarked revenues used to finance
159.
The existence of mutual benefits between regulation and financial regulatory taxes
created a kind of “symbiosis” between two different policy approaches. The term “symbiosis”
is used in biological sciences to denote close physical association between organisms of different species interact to their mutual benefit, as distinguished from parasitic situations in which
an organism species interacts with another organism to its own exclusive benefit damaging
the other party. By extension, in the social sciences “symbiosis” is used to denote situations
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the administrative costs of direct regulation. On the other hand, heightened direct regulation reduces the need for further funds for its financing.
In practice, the more funds raised by regulatory taxes, the more resources
that are available for direct regulation. Through the gradual reduction of
negative externalities by heightened regulation, lower amounts of financial
resources extracted by regulatory taxes are needed.
It could therefore be reasonably expected that the feedback loop between these two policy approaches and their symbiotic operation would
lead to recurring cycles of further reductions of negative externalities.
Moreover, financial regulatory taxes present two important comparative
advantages in terms of practical feasibility over direct regulation, which
significantly contribute to making the former critical to the achievement of
the regulatory goals.
First, they simplify the complex decisions that are taken by firms and
consumers in respect to financial risk by reducing the amount of information that is necessary to market and purchase financial products. Therefore, instead of computing complex information at each stage of the
process, economic actors merely need to factor into their decisions the cost
of financial products and activities impacted by the regulatory taxes and
develop their own strategies on that basis.
Second, new direct regulation requires the establishment of agencies,
the development of new expertise within already existing agencies, and
significant costs for the firms reporting information and authorities collecting it. By contrast, the adoption of regulatory taxes simply places an upstream cost of risk on diverse financial products that is collected through
the already-existing channels of the tax system. This is effective because
firms and consumers will presumably behave according to a price
mechanism.
In the remaining paragraphs of Part VI, we will illustrate how this
interdependence between policy approaches may operate by way of several examples, evidencing how both entity-based regulatory taxes and
FTTs, if properly designed and implemented, can effectively complement
the effects of direct regulation. If one reviews, for example, the most extensive attempt to regulate the financial markets after the 2008 crisis—
(the Dodd-Frank Act),—one can identify the three main goals of direct
regulation: (1) the management of systemic risk, (2) the regulation of components of “shadow banking” markets, including derivatives and repos,
and (3) the establishment of a consumer financial protection agency. Such
direct regulation can be complemented to some extent by the tools of regulatory taxation.
First, regulatory taxes can complement regulation with respect to the
management of systemic risk. One of the chief aims of the Dodd-Frank
Act was to directly contain this type of systemic risk because of the ineffiin which agents interact with one another to their mutual benefit, as distinguished from parasitic situations in which agents interact with other agents to their own exclusive benefit damaging the other agent. See, e.g., GEERAT J. VERMEIJ, THE EVOLUTIONARY WORLD: HOW
ADAPTATION EXPLAINS EVERYTHING FROM SEASHELLS TO CIVILIZATION 106-31 (2010).

Summer 2015]

Global Architecture of Financial Regulatory Taxes

643

ciencies of the pre-crisis regulatory system.160 The Dodd-Frank Act first
introduced a regulatory framework for SIFIs, establishing a more efficient
monitoring of systemic risk. The regulatory framework for SIFIs was accomplished by conferring on the Federal Reserve the power to supervise
and regulate financial firms, which, in case of collapse, may endanger financial stability. The Federal Reserve now oversees banking holding companies and nonbank financial institutions,161 replacing functions
previously carried out by the Securities and Exchange Commission162 and
Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), the latter of which has been
abolished.163
In particular, the Federal Reserve’s supervisory purview includes supervision over risks to the institution itself together with the risks that such
an institution poses to the financial system as a whole.164 In addition, the
Dodd-Frank Act requires major banks and nonbank firms to meet specific
capital and liquidity requirements.165 This goal is also pursued at the international level through the Basel Agreements in order to strengthen capital
requirements.166
These regulatory functions exercised by the Federal Reserve in the
United States, or by similar agencies in other countries, could be complemented by the application of a risky asset-based or liability-based regulatory tax (such as the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee proposed in the
United States). Indeed, such taxes—the burden of which is, by definition,
proportionate to each firm’s contribution to systemic risk and potential
cost in the event of default (see Section III.A)—can give rise to an insurance mechanism which attributes ex ante an insurance cost to financial
firms and leaves to market mechanisms the reduction of risks that create
potential negative externalities, therefore buttressing the purpose behind
160.
Major financial firms were regulated according to their formal labels—as banks,
investment banks, insurance companies, and the like—rather than according to their actual
conduct. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM, GAO-09-216, 5-15 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/
284691.pdf. Diversified financial institutions and non-bank financial companies competed
with banks in the mortgage, consumer credit, and business lending markets, yet escaped the
capital and other requirements imposed on their bank-chartered competitors. Id. at 20, 23-24.
Large financial institutions could choose to be overseen by the regulator that would offer the
least restrictive supervision. Id. at 55.
161.
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1523 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412).
162.
Id. § 618.
163.
Id. § 313.
164.
See id. § 113(a)-(b).
165.
Id. § 115(a)-(c), § 171(b)(2).
166.
For more on regulatory capital, see Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel Comm. on
Banking Supervision, The Basel Committee’s Response to the Financial Crisis: Report to the
G20 (Oct. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf. On the loss absorbency of regulatory
capital, see Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Proposal to
Ensure the Loss Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non-Viability (Aug. 2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf.

644

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 36:603

capital requirements set forth in direct regulation. In addition, revenue
arising from risky asset-based or liability-based regulatory taxes can contribute to the creation of insurance-like funds available for future crisis
management and prevention of systemic collapse. Such funds could also
be used to finance the costs of ongoing regulatory activities.
Notably, the EU Commission, reversing an initial position,167 signaled
that for the purposes of reducing high leveraging, high-risk assets, or limiting the size of financial institutions, it will continue to rely exclusively on
more traditional regulatory tools—such as capital requirements or the definition of risk-weighted assets—rather than use tax measures like those
proposed in the United States (see supra section IV.A).168
An additional example of the complementary use of regulatory taxes
with direct regulation is found in relation to shadow banking markets, particularly OTC derivatives, repo agreements, and securitization programs.
Before 2008, the OTC derivatives market grew disproportionately with respect to the value of the underlying transactions,169 thereby increasing risk
in the financial market as a whole, particularly in light of the fact that OTC
derivatives concentrated risk among big players.170 These derivatives also
increased firms’ counterparty credit exposure and aggravated the impact
of the firms’ failure on the financial system and on the securitization market when synthetic securitization (with embedded derivatives) was
implicated.171
Just before the 2008 crisis, major players used the repo markets for
short-term funding, making them an essential feature of shadow banking.
However, the financial crisis blocked the repo markets, thus triggering a
contraction in credit.172 The Dodd-Frank Act, as a countermeasure, introduced central clearing and exchange trading and strengthened supervision
of market participants. Central clearing is achieved through a mix of limitations and incentives. Limitation comes in the form of compulsory regimes, such as central clearing and trading of standardized derivatives,173
reporting requirements, and higher capital and margin requirements.174
167.
The European Commission was, indeed, initially in favor of the implementation of
a liability-based levy rather than an FTT. See Innovative Financing at the Global Level, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SEC 409 final (Apr. 2010) 16-17, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
articles/international/documents/innovative_financing_global_level_sec2010_409en.pdf.
168.
Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, supra note 11, at 5-6. In regard to
the potential impact of a harmonized EU FTT, which accompanied the Proposal, the European Commission clearly stated that “regulatory measures are more appropriate” for the
purpose of “address[ing] the distortions of financing decisions and the incentives to excessive
leverage created by the different treatment of debt and equity under the current corporate
tax systems.”
169.
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 299.
170.
See id. at 50.
171.
See id. at 57.
172.
Barr, supra note 3, at 105.
173.
See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675-81
(2010) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2).
174.
Id. § 729, 731.
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Supervision is increased through prudential regulation and capital requirements on dealers and other major players in the OTC derivatives
markets.175
Also in regard to the regulation of OTC derivatives and repos, the
previously described measures set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act could, in
theory, be supplemented by regulatory taxation. Specifically, the U.S. government could place a levy based on the FTT model. For example, as illustrated in Section IV.C, the FTT proposed by the EU covers derivative
agreements as well as transactions outside the organized markets, including OTC transactions. Such a tax imposes significant reporting and collection arrangements on financial firms and trading intermediaries, so that
one of the expected results of both direct monitoring and regulatory taxation on shadow banking markets would be the reduction of price volatility
combined with increased transparency. Furthermore, with regard to the
purpose of reducing volatility, a measure such as the proposed EU FTT, in
spite of its intrinsic limitations relating to the relocation risk, may have a
more significant and effective impact than mere direct regulation. While
the FTT, by attributing ex ante an additional cost on targeted trades, provides concrete market incentives to reduce the amount of merely speculative trading, direct regulation can, at most, oversee the transactions that
may create volatility. This monitoring is only expected to reduce transactions that create volatility.
Finally, financial regulatory taxes can complement direct regulation
with respect to consumer protection—another important concern of the
Dodd-Frank Act. While the impact of direct regulation with respect to this
issue in the United States in the short run led to the replacement of the
fragmented financial consumer protection regulation with a single Consumer Financial Protection Bureau through the Dodd-Frank Act,176 the
impact of regulatory taxes—in particular FTTs—could be felt in the medium-run through the alignment of prices of financial products by market
mechanisms. Indeed, Pigouvian taxes, as illustrated in Part II, essentially
signal to the consumer the actual financial risk of products, as the price of
those products would include their negative externalities for the public at
large. This would incentivize consumers to change their behavior in a way
that lowers potential negative externalities.
VII.

POLICY MIX

AND

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

The financial sector’s problem with negative externalities cannot be
solved entirely by replacing direct regulation with regulatory taxes, because the problem arises from a complex bundle of causes.177 In light of
175.
Id. § 731(d)-(e).
176.
See Barr, supra note 3, at 107-08.
177.
As Shackelford, Shaviro, and Slemrod correctly pointed out, the financial sector’s
negative externalities’ “expected social harm, other than the purely pecuniary to the government as insurer, is multi-dimensional and difficult to measure” and “even that pecuniary
harm cannot be measured entirely accurately through a risk-adjusted fee.” They thus conclude that “the classic tax-or-regulation debate is surely beside the point with respect to fi-
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this causal complexity and of the potential interconnections between direct regulation and regulatory taxes, as illustrated in Part VI, a policy mix
of regulatory taxes and direct regulation seems to be an appropriate response to the call for a structured reform of the regulatory framework of
the financial sector; these changes should be applied gradually, as advocated in the Introduction.
Such a policy mix can address different problems. For example, systemic risk can be managed through a levy on risk-weighted assets or on
liabilities based on an insurance mechanism, combined with direct regulation in the form of systemic risk monitoring (including capital requirements) and winding down SIFIs. Likewise, market volatility could be
constrained through another regulatory tax—a multilateral FTT—which
would attempt to internalize the cost of excessive-risk trading by financial
operators, while direct regulation could complement the FTT through
traditional oversight of under-regulated financial markets, in particular
OTC derivatives and securitization programs. Finally, both entity-based
financial regulatory taxes and an FTT, complemented by proper agency
oversight, could successfully attribute the costs of the externalities to the
actors who gave rise to them.
In addition, the collection of earmarked revenue constitutes a collateral, yet not negligible effect of financial regulatory taxes, which can fund
other regulatory programs and potential future bailouts. This is particularly true of entity-based regulatory taxes, which are less prone to avoidance and generate a more stable source of revenue. Specifically, among
the entity-based regulatory taxes, the financial excess-profits tax (addressed in Part IV.B.) is most suitable for this purpose because such a tax
is imposed on activities, such as profit creation, that entities will continue
to maximize.
As illustrated in Section III.B, unilateral application of domestic taxregulatory measures may constitute only the first stage of a larger process
toward the implementation of an effective regulatory tax strategy, and international cooperation should at least take place at the macro-regional
level to prevent major free-riding problems. Therefore, multilateral cooperation should be pursued at least among all of the jurisdictions belonging
to a given financial macro-region (for example, all the jurisdictions belonging to the North American region, the European region or the Asian Pacific region).
Moreover, the jurisdictions willing to cooperate with one another
should pursue an aligned reduction of the core negative externalities. It is
obviously impossible to quantify the exact amount of those externalities in
respect to each contributing national system, but negotiating a minimum
threshold—a sort of de minimis rule—appears to be an attainable goal.
Every country would agree to meet a minimum international standard
nancial institutions, because regulation of the financial sector both is not going away, and
should not.” Shackelford, Shaviro & Slemrod, supra note 98, at 14.
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through mechanisms that are not entirely dictated at international levels
but which are part of a portfolio of agreed-upon financial regulatory taxes.
A possible solution could be the inclusion of global or macro-regional
financial regulatory taxes within the framework of agreements involving
broader economic and political interests, such as, in international trade
agreements. The involved jurisdictions should require that the signatories
to such an agreement adopt a mix of financial regulatory taxes as a condition to signing the agreement. As an alternative to (or in combination
with) such a condition to signing the agreement, a condition of the effectiveness of such an agreement regarding a particular country could serve
the purpose. Conversely, the refusal of adopting the regulatory taxes could
also lead to the exclusion of such country from treaty benefits, including
withdrawal from the treaty. The combination of these measures may prevent free riding by non-cooperating countries. Of course those limitations
should not apply to those signatories of the framework treaties that have
not yet developed mature financial systems capable of creating negative
externalities such as those of the 2008 financial crisis. Applying financial
regulatory taxes on a global level, would be an arduous undertaking akin
to international programs in other contexts in which a cluster of “core
countries” already committed to a standard attempts to recruit other (potentially unwilling) “peripheral countries” to adhere to that standard. Like
in those situations, peripheral countries are incentivized to sign the framework treaty to extract general benefit, even if they plan on defaulting later
to escape from the obligation to implement the financial regulatory taxes.
Therefore, effective implementation may be difficult.
In practice, the only real sanction would be that countries not contributing to the implementation of the global architecture of financial regulatory taxes would be excluded from the benefits provided by those
framework international agreements. The international organizations
dealing with such trade agreements would provide the natural framework
for implementation of this type of multilateral agreement on financial regulatory taxes. For global trade agreements, the WTO would serve as such
international organization; for regional agreements, the European Union,
or the NAFTA Secretariat would serve as such international organization.178 These international organizations could also play a prominent role
178.
The same approach, for example, has been taken through the inclusion of environmental cooperation within the NAFTA framework. Indeed, in 1993, the United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed to sign a side-treaty of NAFTA, the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which aimed at setting out principles and concrete measures regarding conservation and protection of the environment. North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, preamble, art. 1, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Sept. 8, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1480, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=567. The agreement went into effect on January 1, 1994. Furthermore, by means of such agreements the
United States, Canada, and Mexico also established the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which is in charge of bolstering and monitoring the cooperation among the
three countries on the achievement and implementation, respectively, of the goals and measures announced in the NAAEC. PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL
LAW 131-32 (1996).
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in the choice and the design for a harmonized application of regulatory
financial taxes whose adoption should be discussed in the negotiations, as
well as in the implementation process.

